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When the Framers drafted the Sixth Amendment and provided that the accused in a
criminal case would have the right to a speedy and public trial by an "impartial jury," it
is unlikely that they imagined the members of that impartial jury becoming Facebook
friends during deliberations, or running the defendant's name through Google during
trial. But in the past few years, such cases have increasingly been making headlines.
The impact of the Internet on the functioning of the jury has generated a lot of press,
but has not yet attracted scholarly attention. This Article is the first to focus legal
discourse on this underexamined phenomenon.
While the media have characterized this issue as little more than a new variety of juror
misconduct, that description may be unnecessarily simplistic. This Article argues that
juror attempts to gain information about the defendant and about the law may not
reflect misconduct so much as a misplaced sense of responsibility to render the "right"
decision. These efforts might also be a signal from jurors that they are chafing under
the restrictions of their role.
The modern conception of the jury as passive and uninformed has replaced the more
active body envisaged at common law and by the Framers. To earlier legal thinkers,
impartiality meant a lack of familial or financial interest in the outcome of the case, not
ignorance of the facts. This Article argues that we need to rethink the jury's role for the
twenty-first century and restore some of the jury's active engagement in the process of
fact finding. The jury that ultimately emerges-Jury 2.0-may share some characteristics
with its more active forebears.
* Assistant Professor, Georgia State University College of Law; J.D., Columbia University Law
School, 1997; Assistant U.S. Attorney, E.D.N.Y. 2001-o6. I am grateful to Russ Covey, George Fisher,
Jim Jacobs, Paul Lombardo, Dan Richman, Nirej Sekhon, Jonathan Todres, Chuck Weisselberg, and
Adam Zimmerman for their insightful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article.
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Well, I was curious.
-Juror explaining why he had run a Google search of the defendant's
name during trial.'
When the Framers drafted the Sixth Amendment and provided that
the accused in a criminal case would have the right to a speedy and
public trial by an "impartial jury," it is unlikely that they imagined the
members of that impartial jury becoming Facebook friends during
deliberations, or running the defendant's name through Google during
trial. But in the past few years, cases of jurors conducting unauthorized
online research or using the Internet to contact witnesses have
increasingly been making headlines. The impact of the Internet on the
functioning of the jury has generated a lot of press, but has not yet
attracted scholarly attention. This Article seeks to focus discourse on this
underexamined phenomenon.
The media reaction to jurors' online research and networking has
primarily been one of gleeful horror, focusing on the shock value of
"Jurors Gone Wild" headlines.! But casting the efforts of contemporary
jurors to inform themselves as merely an issue of juror misbehavior may
be unnecessarily reductive. Jurors are often trying to gain information
about the defendant's background, the circumstances of the case, and the
effects of the law in an effort to achieve the most accurate result.3 This
Article argues that such attempts may not reflect misconduct so much as
a misplaced sense of responsibility to render the "right" decision.!
From an institution that originally had the power to determine both
law and fact, the modern jury has become a singularly passive animal.' A
I. John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. is, 2009,
at At [hereinafter Jurors Turn to Web] (describing a federal drug trial in Florida where nine of the
jurors had conducted research on the Internet and the judge declared a mistrial).
2. See, e.g., Deirdra Funcheon, Jurors Gone Wild: The Feds Slink Away from a Flubbed Internet
Pharmacy Case, MIAMI NEw TIMES, Apr. 23, 2oo9, http://www.miaminewtimes.cOm/2009-04-23/news/
jurors-and-prosecutors-sink-a-federal-case-against-internet-pharmacies.
3. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
4. One former juror, commenting on the above story, supra note i, on the New York Times's
website, wrote,
The legal system is not designed to discover the truth, but rather to reward whichever
party presents the most convincing argument and evidence. Jurors, on the other hand, feel
the weight of their responsibility and would prefer to know the truth. As someone who has
sat on several juries, in each case myself and the other jurors felt frustrated by the lack of
key information that would help us feel comfortable that we made the right decision, [w]e
also felt deeply frustrated at our inability to fill those gaps in our knowledge.
brad, Comment to Jurors Turn to Web, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2009, 2:46 PM),
http://community.nytimes.com/comiments/www.nytimeS.cOm/2oo9/o3/i8/us/i8juries.html?sort=oldest&
offset=2.
5. Some scholars correlate the jury's loss of power with the democratization of the institution in
allowing people of color and women to participate. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A
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battalion of evidence rules shields the jury from inadmissible information
on the basis that jurors might be misled, or might overvalue discrediting
information about the defendant.' Tradition prevents most jurors from
asking questions' or knowing the sentencing consequences of their
decisions.' Viewed in the most negative light, the jury's role has been
reduced to that of an adding machine, mechanically crunching the
carefully screened evidence that is funneled into it, and producing a
verdict.
Some of these constraints reflect the modern conception of
impartiality, which is frequently confused with ignorance and passivity.
But historically, "impartiality" referred simply to a lack of familial or
financial interest in the outcome of the case.'o The early jury was
supposed to be self-informing, and the jurors not only knew the
defendant and witnesses, but were also entitled to make their own
inquiries." Internet access has given juries a means, albeit an
unauthorized one, of sending a signal that they are chafing under the
restrictions of their role. This Article argues that we should take this
signal seriously and begin to rethink the jury's role for the twenty-first
century. 2 The jury that ultimately emerges-the body I call Jury 2.0"-
may share some characteristics with its more active forbears.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the ways in
which jurors' Internet use interferes with the rules governing both the
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 868 (1994).
6. See John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1195 (1996) ("[O]ur law of evidence strives to prevent error by
excluding from jurors information that might mislead them.").
7. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice); FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (exclusion of
character evidence introduced to prove action in conformity with that character); FED. R. EvID. 404(b)
(evidence of other crimes or bad acts not admissible to prove character, though admissible for other
purposes); FED. R. EvID. 802 (hearsay inadmissible except as otherwise provided).
8. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes lo7-o8 and accompanying text.
1o. See Steven A. Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1658, 1674 (2000).
II. See infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
12. While most of this discussion is equally relevant to civil cases, this Article will focus on
criminal trials. The primary reason is that the stakes are higher, there is more developed doctrinal
regulation, and the questions of how Internet use affects juror impartiality are more pressing.
13. This title plays off the common term for the second phase of the World Wide Web, Web 2.0.
See PAUL ANDERSON, JOINT INFO. SYs. COMm. TECH. & STANDARDS WATCH, WHAT IS WEB 2.0? IDEAS,
TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION (2oo7). Web 2.0 represents the next generation of
Internet activity, which focuses on interactive, collaborative communications between individual users
and organizations, and of which social networking websites such as Facebook, Wikipedia, and
YouTube are prime examples. See Tim O'Reilly, Web 2.o, TTI/VANGUARD (Dec. I, 2oo5),
http//www.ttivanguard.com/ttivanguardcnfmfiles/pdf/dco5/dco 5 session 4 oo3 .pdf (exploring whether such a




functional and symbolic role of the jury. These rules can be classified into
four primary categories: (I) rules that prohibit juror information
gathering, (2) rules that forbid jurors from making conclusions of law,
(3) rules that govern the secrecy and integrity of the deliberation process,
and (4) rules that forbid improper contact between jurors and outside
parties. Part I also considers the concomitant issue of lawyers using the
Web to investigate jurors.
Part II describes and critiques the current legal responses to these
issues, including jury instructions, confiscation, and sequestration. This
Part examines the ineffectiveness of jury instructions alone as a way of
curbing juror behavior and combating the temptations presented by
instant access to information. It considers some of the current
psychological literature regarding online interactions as possible
explanations for the increased incidence of juror misconduct.
Part III draws on the historical development of the jury, and
explores the role of the jury at the time of the Founding. In particular,
this Part suggests that the emerging issue of Internet use by jurors may
reflect an attempt to regain a measure of control over the proceedings
that has since been given over to the legal profession.
Part IV assesses the costs of inaction, in particular the unfairness to
defendants, and argues that changes need to be made. It proposes a
series of measures to enhance jurors' participation in the fact-finding
process and to fulfill their normative function as the conscience of the
community. Some of these measures will be familiar from "active jury"
reforms, such as allowing jurors to take notes, ask questions, and request
clarification. But bolder measures may be needed as well, such as
informing jurors of the sentencing consequences of their decisions, or
allowing jurors a means of describing their experiences, both to alleviate
the pressures they find themselves under and to provide a greater
understanding of their task. The future ramifications of these issues are
still unfolding. Nonetheless, it is not too early to begin to formulate a
reasoned and creative response.
I. JURORS BEHAVING BADLY
This Part describes the ways in which jurors' Internet use interacts
with the rules that govern the functioning of the jury and the legitimacy
of its verdicts. For each rule-regarding factual research, legal research,
deliberations, and outside influences-this Part discusses the governing
legal framework and the main normative and practical challenges to that
framework. In surveying known instances of juror misconduct on the
Internet, this Part tries to go beyond a simple list of anecdotal examples
to examine the motivations behind jurors flouting the rules and to
connect these examples to a more substantive critique of these rules.
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A. JURORS CONDUCTING FACTUAL RESEARCH
At first glance, the issue of jurors seeking information online seems
analogous to the age-old problem of jurors obtaining information from
outside sources, particularly the press. But online research amounts to
more than jurors perusing electronic newspapers. First, online activity
has become fully embedded in most people's everyday lives. While a
juror might refrain from reading the paper, it might be impossible to
refrain from checking her RSS feed. Second, there is an almost limitless
amount of information on the Internet, even about facts or individuals
that would otherwise not be deemed "newsworthy." Third, because there
is no system of fact-checking on the Web, this information might be
incomplete, erroneous, or deliberately false. Fourth, a juror conducting
her own research is likely to be invested in the results because she is
actively engaged in seeking out the information.
i. The Governing Framework
"The theory of our system," wrote Justice Holmes at the turn of the
nineteenth century, "is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will
be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any
outside influence, whether of private talk or public print." 4 Only in open
court can a defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation, cross-
examination, and counsel be protected;" a defendant has no means of
defense against influences, insinuations, and information that reach the
jury behind his back. This remains a cardinal principle of our system. As
the Court has held, "[t]he requirement that a jury's verdict 'must be
based upon the evidence developed at the trial' goes to the fundamental
integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by
jury."
Nonetheless, the "evidence developed at trial" is strictly
circumscribed. The Federal Rules of Evidence and their state
counterparts operate to exclude even relevant, probative evidence, if that
evidence poses a substantial risk of unfair prejudice." This reflects a
14. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). The Court later characterized this language
as an "undeviating rule of this Court." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,351 (1966).
15. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) ("In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in
a criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the 'evidence developed' against a defendant
shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the
defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.").
16. Id. at 472.
17. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403. As Albert Alschuler has observed, most of the law of evidence
"rests on the proposition that the prejudicial impact of relevant information may outweigh its
probative value-in other words, that although judges and rulemakers can understand the limited
worth of this evidence, jurors who evaluate similarly fallible evidence in their everyday lives cannot."
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the
Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 162 (1989).
1584 [Vol. 62:I579
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concern that the "wrong" kind of evidence will distract jurors or cause
them to decide on emotional or irrational bases.' The result is that jurors
operate in a highly restrictive, formalistic environment that ensures that
only some relevant information will be admitted.
The mistrust inherent in rules that bar certain evidence from
reaching the jury in the first place has long provoked criticism." Jeremy
Bentham, an acerbic critic of the then-developing rules of evidence,
urged that the jury should be allowed to hear all the evidence and decide
for themselves whether it was credible or not.2 o "If there be one business
that belongs to a jury more particularly than another," he wrote, "it is,
one should think, the judging of the probability of evidence: if they are
not fit to be trusted with this, not even with the benefit of the judge's
assistance and advice, what is it they are fit to be trusted with?""
The exclusionary nature of the rules of evidence is also the object of
fairly widespread loathing from jurors themselves." As one irate former
juror put it, "courts will just have to accept the fact that most of us want
to know more than we are supposed to know. This is NOT a corruption
of the jury process. The arrogance of the judicial system doling out just
t8. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 4o3 advisory committee's note (explaining that judges may exclude
relevant information if it has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one").
t9. Alschuler has called the rules of evidence "patronizing," "bespeak[ing] limited faith in juries."
Alschuler, supra note 17, at 154; see also Bruce A. Green, "The Whole Truth?": How Rules of
Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 699, 703 (1992) ("[Evidentiary rules] are
predicated in large measure on the law's distrust of juries."). Some commentators have gone so far as
to say that the rules of evidence are morally objectionable. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, The Immoral
Application of Exclusionary Rules, 2oo8 Wis. L. REV. 463, 512 ("Forcing jurors to make decisions on
the basis of a limited, government-screened body of evidence violates jurors' deliberative autonomy
and instrumentalizes them in service to the government's and the litigants' objectives.").
20. 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 9-33 (1827).
21. Id. at 17. Bentham added, "Better trust them with nothing at all, and do without them
altogether." Id.
22. The story in the New York Times about web-surfing jurors garnered nearly 300 comments in
the first hour. See Jurors Turn to Web, supra note I. Many of those comments reflected frustration and
anger with the current system. See, e.g., brad, supra note 4. Another juror recalled his service as
"terribly frustrating" and said he "felt like a potted plant." Matt, Comment to Jurors Turn to Web,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2009, 4:04 PM), http://community.nytimes.com/comments/www.nytimes.com/
2009/o3/I8/us/i8juries.html?sort=oldest&offset=6. Many members of the public echoed these
sentiments. See, e.g., John Lister, Comment to Jurors Turn to Web, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2009, 2:48 PM),
http://community.nytimes.com/comments/www.nytimes.com/20o9/o3/18/us/h8juries.html?sort=oldest&
offset=3 ("Good! Let jurors research as much as they want....I'm tired of jurors being treated as
idiots by the legal profession."); Kyle, Comment to Jurors Turn to Web, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2009, 3:40
PM), http://community.nytimes.com/comments/www.nytimes.com/2009/o3/i8/us/i8juries.html?sort=
oldest&offset=5 ("[Jiustice is not served when the jury is left (sometimes purposefully) in the dark
about cold, hard fact. These technologies allow jurors to make more appropriate decisions and serve
justice more accurately and fairly."); mrnowhere, Comment to Jurors Turn to Web, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17,
2009, 3o8 PM), http://community.nytimes.com/comments/www.nytimes.com/2009/o3/i8/us/i8juries.html?
sort=oldest&offset=3 ("Why are we treating jurors like computers, who are fed predigested
information and churn out an 'impartial' result? Treat jurors like adults. Give them all the
information. They'll get it anyways.").
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enough information to keep us 'pure' is intolerable."" Some jurors, at
least, are frustrated by a sense of not getting the whole picture; they may
feel that the lawyers and the judge form some sort of elite club from
which they are excluded, as if the adversarial system is "based on the
judge and the attorneys being in the know about everything and the jury
being in the dark."24 This may not be new. What has changed, however, is
jurors' ability to do something about it.
2. The Wealth of Online Information
Until recently, there was little jurors could do to indulge their
feelings of frustration and outright curiosity. There were occasional
,6incidents of a juror visiting a crime scene," conducting experiments, or
seeking outside information," but they were relatively uncommon.
Today, most jurors have access to news stories, television segments, blogs
and opinion, criminal records databases, social networking pages, and
general research tools such as Wikipedia and Google at their fingertips.29
And they have not been shy about availing themselves of these
resources. While empirical studies of the phenomenon in this country
23. Ladislav Nemec, Comment to Jurors Turn to Web, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2009, 3:40
PM), http://community.nytimes.com/comments/www.nytimes.com/2oo9/03/i8/us/i8juries.html?sort=
oldest&offset=5. When he sat on a jury, their "decision was certainly influenced by hiding important
facts from us. I chose not the challenge the decision of the majority (it was a civil case) but to this day I
resent the treatment we got." Id.
24. James, Comment to Jurors Turn to Web, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2009, 2:46 PM),
http://community.nytimes.com/comments/www.nytimes.com/2009/03/i8/us/i8juries.html?sort=oldest&
offset=2.
25. See, e.g., Gafford v. Warden, 434 F.2d 318, 320 (loth Cir. 1970) (juror went to gas station
mentioned at trial to determine whether station had been open at the time described in the testimony);
Saperito v. State, 490 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind. 1986) (juror visited duplex apartment where assault
occurred and measured width of the doors); Dyer v. State, 342 N.E.2d 671, 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976)
(juror visited car dealership to see whether alibi witness could have seen what he described).
26. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703, 709 (Ct. App. 1981) (juror in murder by
poisoning case conducted experiment to see whether baking soda dissolved in water overnight);
People v. Smith, 453 N.E.2d lo79, lo8o (N.Y. 1983) (juror looked into rear windows of cars while
walking to dinner to see whether arresting officers could have seen defendant in back seat of cab);
People v. Brown, 399 N.E.2d 51, 52 (N.Y. 1979) (juror conducted experiment to see whether police
witness could have seen face of driver in adjacent car).
27. See, e.g., Paz v. United States, 462 F.2d 740, 745 (5th Cir. 1972) (books about drugs and drug
trafficking found in jury room in narcotics case); United States v. Staples, 445 F.2d 863, 863 (5th Cir.
197) (law books found in jury room during deliberations); People v. Holmes, 372 N.E.2d 656, 657 (Ill.
1978) (in case where identification of defendant turned on footprint left in the snow, several jurors
went to Florsheim shoe store to see whether heels of shoes contained brand name logo).
28. See Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796--1996, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 2673, 2675 (1996) ("[Flew cases today are plagued by misconduct.").
29. As of June 30, 2010, over 239 million people in the United States were using the Internet-
approximately seventy-seven percent of the population. Internet Usage and Population in North
America, INTERNET WORLD STATS (June 30, 2010), http://internetworldstats.com/stats'4.htm. While
there have been numerous instances of jurors using iPhones and Blackberries to access the Internet
even from the courthouse, because most felony trials last longer than a day, jurors also have ample
time to consult their home computers in the evenings.
1586 [Vol. 62:1579
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have not yet been fully undertaken,o a recent survey of jurors conducted
in England found that more than twenty-five percent of jurors had seen
information about their cases on the Internet during trial.3"
In the United States, a growing number of cases reflect instances in
which jurors have attempted to supplement the information at trial
through online research, particularly Google. The most notorious recent
example was a federal case in Florida, in which the defendants were
charged with illegally running an Internet pharmacy." After seven weeks
of trial, during the course of deliberations, the judge discovered that not
one, but eight of the twelve jurors had conducted Internet research about
the case during trial.33 As one of the defense lawyers described it, the
jurors "Googled defendants' names. They Googled definitions of
medical terms. There was a lot of Googling going on."34 One juror
discovered that "one of the defendants had once been implicated for
prescribing medicine that was used in a double suicide."" In addition, an
alternate juror was found to have been surfing the Web on his cell phone
during breaks in testimony." The judge declared a mistrial."
Not every case is as spectacular. But a quick survey of recent cases
shows instances where jurors have run Google searches on the
defendant," the names of co-conspirators," and the defense lawyer.4 In
30. The New Media Project of the Conference of Court Public Information Officers recently
conducted a survey of nearly I6oo judges and court personnel -though not of jurors -about issues of
social media use by and in the courts. Fewer than ten percent of judges reported seeing jurors use
social networking sites in the courtroom. See CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS, NEW MEDIA
AND THE COURTS: THE CURRENT STATUS AND A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 67 (2010) [hereinafter CCPIO
REPORT]. This statistic obviously does not shed any light on how much online research and
commentary is being conducted by jurors outside of the courtroom.
31. See CHERYL THOMAS, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, ARE JURIES FAIR? 43 (20Io), available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/are-juries-fair-research.pdf. Thomas conducted surveys of
668 jurors post-trial and obtained a ninety-eight percent response rate. See id. at 12-13. Five percent of
jurors in non-high-profile cases, and twelve percent of jurors in high-profile cases admitted to
conducting Internet research about their cases during trial. See id. at 43. In contrast, twenty-six percent
of jurors only said they "saw" media reports concerning their cases on the Internet. Id. As Thomas
noted, these figures might be on the low side because, although the jurors were guaranteed anonymity,
"it should be borne in mind that they were being asked to admit to doing something they may have
remembered being told not to do by the judge." Id. This might explain why "a much higher proportion
of jurors said they saw media reports of their case on the internet during the trial compared to those
who admitted looking for information about the case on the internet." Id. If we assume that British
jurors are no more lawless than American ones, this is a worrying statistic.
32. See Funcheon, Jurors Gone Wild, supra note 2.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The defendant's lawyer had specifically moved in limine to make sure that information
would be excluded. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
j8. See, e.g., Rucker v. Patrick, No. 07cvo364-IEG (RBB), 2oo8 WL 4504230, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
Sept. 3, 2oo8).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Sabir, 628 F. Supp. 2d 414, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo7). In Sabir, the jury
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other cases, jurors have discovered that a prosecution witness was in
protective custody because of the defendant;4 looked up the Myspace
profile of one of the teenage victims in a felony sexual abuse case;42
accessed the Facebook page of a defendant accused of aggravated
burglary with a weapon, where he showed a picture of himself holding a
gun; tried to look up the defendant's prior criminal record on a police
department website;" looked up the driving record of a truck driver in a
negligence action;45 looked up defendants' ages and dates of birth;46
researched oppositional defiant disorder;47 researched alternative causes
of death in a manslaughter case;s researched the effect on blood alcohol
of the drug Narcan in a vehicular homicide case;49 looked up a definition'
of "lividity" and the role it might have had in fixing the time of a beating
victim's death;"o researched the injury of retinal detachment in a child-
murder case;" and determined whether a particular type of firearm could
have damaged a bullet-proof vest."
Not only is there a wealth of information online, but that
information also takes a lot less effort to find than it used to in the analog
world. Rather than having to get in their cars to calculate how long it
sent a note to the judge stating that it knew that the defendant's co-conspirator, Tarik Shah, had pled
guilty, a fact which had not been admitted into evidence. Id. Upon being questioned, Juror Number
Eight "stated that it was '[n]ot research, but I was curious as to why Mr. Shah was not here, and what
happened to him .... So I Googled Tarik Shah."' Id.
40. See, e.g., People v. Owen, No. Do48o9o, 2007 WL 4260487, at *3-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6,
2007).
41. See Andrea F. Siegel, Jury Acquits Man Accused of Shooting Crofton Woman, BALT. SUN
Nov. 7, 2oo9, at A5.
42. See John G. Browning, When All That Twitters Is Not Told, 73 TEX. B.J. 217, 217 (2010)
(describing a West Virginia case).
43. See Amelia Hill, Judges "Giving Up" Trying to Stop Juries' Online Research, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Oct. 5, 20Io, at to. The defendant had also christened his Facebook page a "gangster zone." Id.
44. People v. Garcia, No. Co49205, 2007 WL 29949, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2007); see also
Nick Madigan, Juror's Misconduct Leads to New Trial in Gang Killing, BALT. SUN, Sept. 12, 20oo, at
A3 (vacating a Baltimore gang member's conviction, after juror performed an Internet search on the
defendant's prior criminal record).
45. Sharpless v. Sim, 209 S.W. 3 d 825, 828 (Tex. App. 2oo6).
46. State v. Howard, 68o N.W.2d 832, 832 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
47. Wardlaw v. Maryland, 971 A.2d 331, 334 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009).
48. State v. Boling, 127 P-3 d 740, 741 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). In Boling, the juror, a former
biology professor, was "not impressed" with the medical examiner's testimony as to cause of death. Id.
He then conducted his own research over the Internet to determine an alternate cause of death, which
he then shared with the other jurors. Id.
49. State v. Armstrong, 691 S.E.2d 433,444 (N.C. Ct. App. 200).
50. Brief of Appellant at 8, Clark v. State (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (No. 953), 2oo9 WL 4276755.
The defendant's conviction was vacated on appeal on the basis that the juror's inquiry violated the
trial court's order prohibiting jurors from researching the case. See Del Quentin Wilber, With Social
Networking, Justice Not So Blind, WASH. PosT, Jan. 9, 20oo, at Ci.
51. Brian Grow, Juror Could Face Charges for Online Research, REUTERS, Jan. 19, 2011, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2o 1/0/1 9 /us-internet-juror-idUSTRE7ol 5 KI2oI 10119 (describing
partial mistrial in a Pennsylvania case).
52. People v. Dale, No. Eo3329 0, 2004 WL 1260241, at *I (Cal. Ct. App. June 9, 2004).
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would take to drive from one location to another," which is time
consuming and expensive, jurors can now simply map online the distance
between two towns54 or between the crime scene and the site of the
defendant's arrest," or use a cell phone equipped with MapQuest to
measure the distance between a store where an alleged child molestation
took place and the defendant's house 6 without having to inconvenience
themselves a bit.
These examples alone probably understate the breadth of the
phenomenon." For one thing, the examples given represent only those
cases where the misconduct has come to the court's attention, either
through a juror directly approaching the court, or through postverdict
interviews with jurors by the parties or the press.'5 What is not captured
are those situations in which a juror conducts online research but does
not share that fact with her fellow jurors. Nor do these examples account
for situations in which jurors mention to their colleagues that they have
done forbidden research, but those colleagues do not tell the court for
fear of causing delay and extending their service.59 As one former juror,
who chose to keep mum about a fellow juror's online searches about the
defendant, explained: "If everybody did the right thing, the trial, which
took two days, would have gone on for another bazillion years."
53. See, e.g., Russell v. State, 661 P.2d 1293, 1293 (Nev. 1983) (juror went to defendant's place of
employment and timed drive from there to scene of the crime); State v. Arney, 544 P.2d 334, 338 (Kan.
1975) ("[A juror] timed the drive from the scene of the homicide on 77th Street to defendant's home
on 13th Street, and from there to defendant's place of work a few blocks away.").
54. See, e.g., United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3 d 350,359 (6th Cir. 2oo8).
55. See John Murray, UNPLUG!, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 14, 20o0, at Bi (describing how a
Marion Superior Court judge dismissed a juror from murder trial for mapping the distance between
key locations).
56. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 620 S.E.2d 394,397-98 (Ga. Ct. App. 2oo5).
57. One journalist has compiled a tally of reported decisions in which litigants have moved for a
new trial in whole or in part because of juror misuse of the Internet. Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online,
U.S. Trials Go Off Track, REUTERS, Dec. 8, 20oo, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2oIo/
12/o8/us-internet-jurors-idUSTRE6B 7 4Z8201OI2o8. Grow found that since 1999, at least ninety
verdicts have been challenged because of Internet misuse, with more than half of the cases occurring
in the past two years. Of the ninety challenges, twenty-eight were successful, including twenty-one
since January 2009. See id. In Grow's estimation, "[t]hese figures do not include the many incidents
that escape judicial notice." Id.
58. In that sense, nothing has changed and most jury misconduct only comes to light if the jurors
themselves alert the court. See Dennis Edwards, Jr., A Judge's Review of Juror Misconduct, 27 How.
L.J. 1519, 1520 (1984) ("If the jurors remain silent, most instances of jury misconduct will go
undetected.").
59. See, e.g., Talk of the Nation: Social Media Crashes the Courtroom (National Public Radio
broadcast Sept. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Talk of the Nation], transcript available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=i 12926570. One of the show's callers was a former jury foreman in
a civil case where a juror admitted that she had Googled the defendant and found discrediting
information. The caller stated that he "didn't feel really necessary to tell the judge, [but] probably
should have." Id.
60. Jurors Turn to Web, supra note 1.
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The available evidence may also underestimate the seriousness of
the transgressions. Even in cases where juror research does come to the
attention of the court, some jurors may minimize the extent of their
online peregrinations, and trial courts appear inclined to believe them.6
Certainly those who actually work with juries-judges, practitioners, and
jury consultants-seem to think the problem is on the rise.2 "You just
have to figure it's happening," said one public defender. "[Jurors] go
home at night and look up whatever they can. That's what people do."6
As one state supreme court justice put it, "I think this is one of the
biggest concerns that we have about fair trials in the future." 64
3. A Specific Example: The Defendant's Criminal Record
Some of the instances of juror research-calculating the distance
between two locations, for example, or reading about the physiological
effects of a drug-may reflect a juror's dissatisfaction with the way the
evidence was presented, or its perceived lack of clarity or completeness.6 5
Some of the other instances, however, represent attempts by jurors to
obtain entirely new information that otherwise would have been
excluded from the case." These are the occasions where the consequences
of lack of confrontation are at their most serious.
To explore the possible ramifications of juror research in this
context, I will focus on a simple-and common-example: a criminal
case in which the defendant has a prior criminal record. The rules of
evidence in both federal and state systems forbid the prosecutor from
introducing evidence of the defendant's criminal past to show his
61. See, e.g., Buford v. Grp. Health Coop., No. 42915-9-1, 2000 WL 44123, at *II (Wash. Ct. App.
Jan. 18, 2000) (juror who had run an Internet search on twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome testified
that once she found that there was information available, she did not open or read any of the retrieved
documents); Ellen Brickman et al., How Juror Internet Use Has Changed the American Jury Trial, I J.
Or. INNOVATION 287, 288-89 (2oo8). Brickman and her colleagues describe a New York murder case in
which three prospective jurors admitted to conducting research on the case on their cell phone web
browsers during a break in voir dire. After the first juror was rebuked by the court, the other two
prospective jurors, "perhaps upon seeing the judge's reaction to the first juror's search, said they had
not actually read any of the search results." Id.
62. See, e.g., Brickman et al., supra note 61, at 30 (noting the authors' experience as trial
consultants that jurors were increasingly using the Internet to research their cases). "Jurors are
generally very astute, and if they sense missing pieces of the puzzle or are left with unanswered
questions, the temptation to 'cheat' by running a quick Internet search from their couch may be hard
to resist." Rosalind R. Greene & Jan Mills Spaeth, Are Tweeters or Googlers in Your Jury Box? ARIZ.
Arr'Y, Feb. 20oo, at 38, 40.
63. Wilber, supra note 50 (quoting A.J. Kramer, Washington's Public Defender). Kramer added,
"I'm not sure what you can do about it nowadays, to tell you the truth, especially for younger people.
That's what they grow up doing." Id.
64. Laura A. Bischoff, Courthouse Tweets Not So Sweet, Say Judges, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Feb.
12, 2oo, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/trial-procedure-judges/13916591-i.html (quoting
Ohio State Supreme Court Justice Judith Lanzinger).
65. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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propensity for criminal activity,6 though the rules permit such evidence
for certain limited purposes6 and for impeachment should the defendant
testify. 9 The reason, as discussed above, is the fear that the jury will
overvalue evidence of the defendant's past bad acts and will be more
likely to convict.o
This fear is not ill-founded. Empirical evidence from mock juror
studies" has borne out Richard Lempert's hypothesis that "the mistaken
conviction of those with criminal records is likely to be perceived as less
regrettable than the mistaken conviction of individuals thought never to
have been in trouble with the law."" Studies of real cases have shown
both that defendants with criminal records testify less frequently than
defendants without criminal records, 7  and that, in borderline cases, if
evidence of a prior record is brought to the jury's attention, the jury is
more likely to convict.74 The result is that, frequently, defendants are
67. See, e.g., FED. R. EvIo. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving an action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.");
FED. R. EvID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.").
68. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (evidence of prior crimes or bad acts admissible for purposes
"such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident").
69. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 6o9(a)(i) (evidence of a felony conviction may be admitted for
purposes of impeaching the defendant "if the court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused"); FED. R. EvID. 6o9(a)(2) (evidence of
crime of dishonesty admissible to impeach the defendant).
70. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948) (observing that character evidence is
excluded not because it is irrelevant; "on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to
so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to
defend against a particular charge").
71. See, e.g., Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror
Decision Making, 59 LAW & Hum. BEHAv. 67,76 (1995) (finding that mock jurors who read evidence of
a prior conviction were more likely to convict on new charges); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks,
On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on
Guilt, 9 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 37,47 (1985) (concluding, based on 16o-person study, that presentation of
a defendant's criminal record "does increase the likelihood of conviction, and that the judge's limiting
instructions do not appear to correct that error").
72. Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1021, 1039 0977).
73. See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect
ofa Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353,
1371 (2oo9) (showing that, in empirical study of 330 criminal trials, sixty-two percent of defendants
without criminal records testified, compared to forty-five percent of defendants with prior records).
74. See id. at 1385. Eisenberg and Hans found that "the jury's learning of a defendant's prior
record is significantly associated with whether that defendant testified." Id. at 1379. They further
found that, while evidentiary strength (as reported by the jurors themselves) is the most important
factor leading to conviction, in borderline cases, learning of the defendant's prior record could
compensate for a weaker prosecution case and lead juries to convict. See id. at 1386. While in weak
cases, the authors found that the dominant tendency was not to convict, "in the strongest of weak
cases, the existence of a prior criminal record can prompt a jury to convict... [t]he prior record




deterred from taking the stand in their own defense for fear that their
prior convictions will come into evidence."
In the past, a person's criminal history, or "rap sheet," was easily
accessible only to the prosecutor, the court, and law enforcement
personnel.,6 Today, when it is commonplace for people to conduct an
online background check of each other before a first date, running
someone's name in a database has become second nature. And as the
boundaries that separate criminal records information from the public
become increasingly porous, anyone can simply look up any person's
criminal history across all the states over the Internet.'" Some sites, such
as criminalsearches.com, are free and do not even require registration.79
A juror who runs a defendant's name through Google, therefore, could
easily come across prior convictions. In these situations, the rules of
evidence are losing their ability to preserve the legal fiction that the
defendant stands before the jury unencumbered by his past misdeeds.
So what is a criminal defendant with a prior record supposed to do?
If the cost of testifying is linked to the risk of impeachment by prior
convictions, a higher probability that the jury will discover the
information anyway would lower the cost of testifying. Over time, this
could conceivablz lead to more defendants testifying and telling their
side of the story. On the other hand, it is at least as likely that this risk
75. See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record-Lessons
from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 479 (2oo8). In an empirical study of
later-exonerated defendants, Blume found that most of the defendants failed to testify because they
had a prior record and "believed, or their lawyers believed, that if the jury knew the defendant had
previously committed another criminal offense, it would be more likely-despite the judge's
instructions to the contrary-to conclude that the defendant is the type of person who would have
[committed the instant offense]." This is not to say that fear of impeachment by prior convictions is the
only reason a defendant might not testify; other factors such as communication abilities, perceived jury
appeal, and the threat of perjury charges or obstruction of justice enhancements can also deter
defendants from taking the stand in their own defense.
76. James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 387,40 (2oo6).
77. See, e.g., D. Ordes, Comment to Jurors Turn to Web, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. I7, 2009, 3:12 PM),
http://community.nytimes.com/comments/www.nytimes.com/2009/03/i8/us/i8juries.html?sort=oldest&
offset=4 ("I wouldn't have lunch with a stranger without checking first with Google. Why should I pass
judgment on a person in trial without a similar screening?").
78. There is no shortage of paid services that provide instant criminal record information. See,
e.g., CRIMINAL-INFO.COM, http://criminal-info.com (last visited July 4, 2011) ("Over 250 million Criminal
Records at your fingertips!"); Get an Instant Credit Check, INTELIUS, http://www.intelius.com/
criminal-check.html (last visited July 4, 20II) ("[I]nstant access to records of criminal convictions,
felonies, misdemeanors, sex offenses and other criminal offenses associated with a name.");
CRIMINALRECORDS.COM, http://www.criminalrecords.com/ (last visited July 4, 201I) ("Sometimes you
just wish there's a way for you to determine the good guys and the bad guys. Well now, you can.").
79. See, e.g., CRIMINALSEARCHES.COM, http://www.criminalsearches.com (last visited July 4, 2011)
("Do you really know who people are? Start a FREE Criminal Search on anyone today!"); see Brad
Stone, If You Run a Red Light, Will Everyone Know?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2oo8, at 4 (Business).
8o. For a provocative discussion of the dignitary and expressive values of defendant speech, see
Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, so N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1479-
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might simply lead to fewer trials, concentrating them among the famous,
the wealthy, or those savvy enough to wage an effective propaganda war
on the Web."' If a defendant has a particularly lengthy or egregious rap
sheet, or has a conviction for a similar crime to the one charged, the fear
that this information could come to the jury's attention surreptitiously
could deter the defendant from going to trial at all.
These concerns are not limited to defendants with criminal records,
as defendants with no prior records could easily be mistaken for
someone else online. A curious juror, unlike a member of law
enforcement, is unlikely to have access to the defendant's date of birth or
Social Security number. If all she has to go on is a common name, like
"John Smith," she might lack the tools to accurately match the
information with the defendant. Even if the record found correctly
identifies the defendant, its information might be inaccurate."' Dismissed
charges, quashed warrants, and expunged convictions may all survive
online, and criminal records databases are not known for their up-to-the-
minute updates or attention to fact-checking.83 So not only the defendant
with a criminal record, but all other defendants, might be tarred with
discrediting information sought out by jurors who know how to conduct
online research but not necessarily how to test the accuracy of what they
find.
B. RULES CURTAILING THE JURY'S POWER To DECIDE THE LAW
Jurors are not only indulging their curiosity about facts relating to
their cases, but are also engaging in unauthorized legal research. Flouting
the strong presumption that their task as jurors is to follow the law as
stated to them by the judge, they are double-checking legal terms,
seeking out competing definitions, and poring over sentencing
information-all of which are now much easier to do with the online
tools at their disposal.
80 (2o05).
81. During her prosecution for false statements, Martha Stewart maintained a defense website,
Marthatalks.com. See Bernard Hibbitts, Martha Stewart Statement on Appeal, JuRusT (Mar. 5, 2004,
3:32 PM), http://jurist.1aw.pitt.edu/paperchase/2oo4_03_05_indexarch.htm. When the guilty verdict was
returned, she wrote, "I continue to take comfort in knowing that I have done nothing wrong." Id.
82. See Jacobs, supra note 76, at 416-18.
83. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 709 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). While "law
enforcement has an increasing supply of information within its easy electronic reach," wrote Justice
Ginsburg, "[t]he risk of error stemming from these databases is not slim. Herring's amici warn that law
enforcement databases are insufficiently monitored and often out of date. Government reports
describe, for example, flaws in NCIC databases, terrorist watchlist databases, and databases associated
with the Federal Government's employment eligibility verification system." Id. (citations omitted).
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i. The Governing Framework
The orthodox view, succinctly stated by Justice Story in 1835, is that
it is "the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the
duty of the jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the court."4 There
nonetheless remained some question about the jury's power to mitigate
the law by finding verdicts of lesser included offenses until the Supreme
Court decided Sparf v. United States" sixty years later.
In Sparf, two seamen were charged with murder on the high seas, a
capital offense. The defendants were denied an instruction to the jury
that it could find the defendants guilty of manslaughter.8' The jury itself,
during deliberations, returned to the courtroom to ask the judge whether
it could return a verdict of manslaughter, which was not punishable by
death." The court repeatedly told the jury that if it found there had been
a homicide, "the facts of the case do not reduce it below murder" and
therefore its verdict "cannot properly be manslaughter."' The jury
thereupon returned a verdict of murder.'
The Supreme Court held that the district court had correctly
instructed the jury that, "on account of the absence of all evidence
tending to show that the defendants were guilty of manslaughter, they
could not, consistently with law, return a verdict of guilty of that crime.""
Although the Court's ruling did not expressly prohibit judges from
instructing juries that they could determine the law, Justice Harlan's
opinion for a five-Justice majority left little doubt of his position on the
matter. If "juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law as
expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto themselves," he
wrote, "[p]ublic and private safety alike would be in peril.""
While the principles espoused in Sparf were all but unanimously
adopted by the courts, the Sparf opinion itself was hotly contested.
Justices Gray and Shiras dissented; in their view, the judge's instructions
denied the jury "their right to decide the law."93 In an opinion notable for
its thoughtful and detailed historical analysis, they wrote:
84. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545).
85. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
86. Id. at 52.
87. Id. at 53.
88. Id. at 62 n.i (transcribing colloquy between juror and the trial court, where the juror asked,
"[a] crime committed on the high seas must have been murder, or can it be manslaughter?").
89. Id.
9o. Id. at 52.
91. Id. at iol. Any other rule, wrote the Court, "would bring confusion and uncertainty in the
administration of the criminal law." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at I13 (Gray, J., dissenting).
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It is our deep and settled conviction ... that the jury, upon the general
issue of guilty or not guilty in a criminal case, have the right, as well as
the power, to decide, according to their own judgment and consciences,
all questions, whether of law or of fact.94
One hundred years later, there is barely a trace of this debate in the
courts.95 Whether this is due to the rise of an entirely more complex body
of criminal law, the professionalization of lawyers, or the democratization
of jury composition, the norm today is for judges to instruct juries that
they must accept the law as stated by the court.6 Critics charge that such
limitations on the jury's power "appear to reflect a pervasive fear that
our heterogeneous jurors, unbound by common principles of morality,
education and dedication to the law, may deviate too far from judicial
views of the rule of law unless tightly controlled.""
Some jurors find this restriction frustrating and experience their lack
of access to the law as belittling. "Being on a jury is a humiliating and
degrading experience," griped one former juror: "The lawyers and judges
assume that you are too stupid to understand anything but the most
rudimentary legal concepts. Maybe if jurors were not treated like the
annoying children that someone brought uninvited to the adult party,
they would not go out on their own to get information."9
Accordingly, many of the situations in which jurors have sought
legal information over the Internet have reflected either confusion with
the legal instructions they received, or dissatisfaction with a legal
explanation. The reported cases thus feature jurors looking up legal
94. Id. at' 14.
95. The literature, too, is primarily concerned with the jury's power to nullify the law and return a
verdict of acquittal regardless of the evidence, rather than its power to mitigate the law. See generally
Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 253 (1996); Nancy S. Marder,
The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 877, 881-82 (1999); Arie M. Rubenstein, Note,
Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modem Jury Trial, zo6 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 96o (2oo6).
As this Part focuses on the jury's power to determine the law, rather than reject the law outright, the
issue of nullification is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf THOMAS ANDREw GREEN, VERDICT
ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800, at xiii
(1985) (contrasting instances of nullification which reflected the jury's view that the act charged was
not unlawful with those instances where "the jury does not quarrel with the law but believes that the
prescribed sanction is too severe").
96. See, e.g., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIsTRIcr COURTS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
§ 3.01 (rev. ed. 2oo8) ("It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence admitted in this case. To
those facts you must apply the law as I give it to you.... It is your duty to apply the law exactly as I
give it to you, whether you agree with it or not."); PATTERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUcTIONS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, § I.oI Function of the Court and Jury (1998) ("You have two duties as a jury.
Your first duty is to decide the facts from the evidence in the case. This is your job, and yours alone.
Your second duty is to apply the law that I give you to the facts. You must follow these instructions,
even if you disagree with them.").
97. United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).





definitions of such words as "attempt," "distribution," and "possess" in a
narcotics case;" "great bodily injury" in a domestic violence case;o
"deliberating" in a racketeering case;"o. and "prudent" in a manslaughter
1O2
case.
These cases are functionally similar to past cases where jurors
referred to law books or dictionaries. 3 Unlike attempts to uncover
extraneous factual information, which the courts consider presumptively
prejudicial,o4 .[i]f a juror is exposed to extraneous information that
involves merely supplementing the Court's legal instructions it remains
within the province of the judge to determine whether this conduct
distorted the jury's understanding of the law to the prejudice of the
defendant."'" Few courts have thus declared mistrials in cases where
jurors have researched the meaning of legal terms online."'
2. A Specific Example: Information Regarding Punishment
One area, however, in which the legal information does introduce
new facts, as opposed to merely offering a competing definition, is
sentencing. Because of the generally acknowledged rule that "when a
jury has no sentencing function, it should be admonished to 'reach its
verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed,""'" most
courts warn juries not to concern themselves with the consequences of
their verdicts.o8
In Shannon v. United States, the Court characterized the
"[i]nformation regarding the consequences of a verdict" as "irrelevant to
the jury's task," reasoning that the division of labor in the criminal justice
99. United States v. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3 d 29, 36 (Ist Cit. 2009).
oo. People v. Hamlin, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 445-46 (Ct. App. 2009) (finding error harmless
because juror was unable to find any information online).
ioi. United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 667 (7th Cir. 2007).
102. Tapanes v. State, 43 So. 3d 159, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2oo).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566, 567 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming conviction in
case where juror made unauthorized use of a dictionary to look up the words "callous" and "wanton");
United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1244-45 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming conviction where juror
looked up word "organize").
104. See Cheyenne, 855 F.2d at 568.
1o5. United States v. Estrada, 45 F.3d 1215, 1226 (8th Cir. 1995).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 683-84 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming district
court's denial of motion for new trial); People v. Hamlin, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 445-46 (Ct. App. 2009)
(affirming trial court's denial of motion for new trial). But see Tapanes, 43 So. 3d at 162 (reversing trial
court's denial of motion for new trial as abuse of discretion).
107. Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (footnote omitted) (quoting Rogers v.
United States, 422 U.S. 35,40 (975)).
lo8. See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.08 (2010)
("Do not concern yourself with what the penalty might be if you should find the defendant guilty.");
ILLINOIs PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS -CRIMINAL § 27.07 inst. 1.o (2ooo) ("You are not to concern
yourself with possible punishment or sentence for the offense charged during your deliberations. It is
the function of the trial judge to determine the sentence should there be a verdict of guilty.").
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system left the determination of guilt to the jury and the determination
of punishment to the judge." "Moreover, providing jurors sentencing
information invites them to ponder matters that are not within their
province, distracts them from their fact-finding responsibilities, and
creates a strong possibility of confusion.""o
But the Court's reasoning is unpersuasive. To say that jurors should
not be concerned with the consequences of their verdict because it is not
their place to be concerned with the consequences of their verdict is no
more than circular. If the role of the jury involves not only "reliable fact-
finding and republican self-government" but also "normative
judgment,"' then the jury's determination of whether a legislatively
mandated sentence is appropriate is a critical part of that judgment.
Daniel Richman has observed that evidentiary doctrines that keep
factual information away from juries tend to "rob verdicts of the power
to communicate the community's prosecutorial preferences."" It can
equally be said that keeping sentencing information away from juries
robs verdicts of the power to communicate the community's judgment of
what constitutes just punishment. This deprives society and the
legislature of valuable information about the community's conception of
just desserts, muddying the message of moral condemnation."'
But now sentencing ranges, including mandatory minimums and
maximum penalties, are freely available online."' This has given jurors
the opportunity to obtain the information easily and share it with their
fellow jurors. For the most part, the courts have been relatively quick to
grant mistrials in these situations."' In a DUI-death case in Mississippi,
one of the jurors looked up the maximum and minimum penalties online
1o9. Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579.
I to. Id.
III. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 122
(1997).
112. See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 979 (1997). "Every evidentiary rule that-for fear of jury
misvaluation, 'inflammation,' or nullification-prevents the jury from learning something about a
criminal defendant, his victim, or his crime tends to rob verdicts of the power to communicate the
community's actual prosecutorial priorities." Id. at 976.
113. "No man who claims innocence can be condemned as guilty unless the community, via the
jury, pronounces him worthy of moral condemnation." AMAR, supra note III, at 123. See Richard E.
Myers II, Requiring a Jury Vote of Censure to Convict, 88 N.C. L. REV. 137, 143 (2009) (arguing that
the current system of inarticulate verdicts obscures the ability of jury verdicts to reflect the judgment
of the community on a defendant's blameworthiness).
114. Putting "drug sentences Illinois," for example, into Google summoned up a handy chart of all
sentencing ranges for every type of drug. See Illinois Drug Laws, ILLINOIS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY,
http://www.iwu.edulccs/Illinois._DrugLaws.htm (last visited July 4, 2011).
115. There are exceptions. See People v. Lister, No. Do47684, 2oo6 WL 3826658, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 29, 2oo6) (excusing a juror who had looked up penalty for drug crime and shared
information with other jurors, and permitting deliberations to continue).
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and the judge felt he had "no choice" but to grant a mistrial." In a North
Carolina cocaine case, the jury foreman searched the state General
Assembly's website for the statute setting forth drug violations and
penalties."' He then brought a printout of the statute to court and sent
the judge a note asking whether he was permitted to share it with his
fellow jurors, explaining that "he felt the judge had not answered their
questions clearly and he simply wanted to tell the others what the law
was."" The judge reluctantly declared a mistrial."'
While the mistrials seem to be granted on the theory that the jury's
awareness of sentencing consequences will prejudice the defense, that is
not necessarily the case. 2 o Indeed, in a recent child pornography case
before Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York,
several jurors, when polled, explicitly told the judge that they would not
have found the defendant guilty of receiving child pornography if they
had known that he would be incarcerated for a mandatory minimum of
five years."' In a typically bold move, Judge Weinstein decided to grant a
new trial on those charges on the basis that he should have informed the
jury of the mandatory minimum sentence."' Given the proliferation of
mandatory minimum sentences and high advisory guidelines, providing
jurors with sentencing information would, he wrote, "enable the jury to
more effectively fulfill its historical Sixth Amendment role as the
conscience of the community and guardian against government
oppression.""'
This is not to say that jurors finding this information out for
themselves in a haphazard, unauthorized manner will lead to better
results. On the contrary, it raises serious questions of arbitrariness, in
that some juries will be informed and others will not."4 But given the
ease with which jurors can now access sentencing information,
116. Karen Nelson, Judges Say Technology in Jurors' Hands Threatens Court Cases, BILOXI SUN
HERALD, Apr. 25, 201o, available at 2010 WLNR 8530803 (quoting Circuit Court Judge Robert Krebs
of Jackson County, MS).
117. See Keren Rivas, Jury's Conduct Leads to Mistrial: Foreman Brought in Copy of Law,
Discussed it with Jurors, TiMEs-NEws (Burlington, N.C.), Apr. 23, 20o0, available at 20I0 WLNR
8452132.
I8. Id.
ii9. Id. ("[Judge] Allen said he regretted to have to do that but he felt he didn't have any other
choice.").
120. See Milton Heumann & Lance Cassak, Not-So-Blissful Ignorance: Informing Jurors About
Punishment in Mandatory Sentencing Cases, 20 AM. CiuM. L. REV. 343, 344 (1983).
121. United States v. Polouizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 320 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
122. Id. at 449-50.
123. United States v. Polouizzi, 687 F. Supp. 2d 133, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 20l). In the interim, the
Second Circuit vacated Judge Weinstein's initial order and remanded the case. United States v.
Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 2oo9).
124. See Heumann & Cassak, supra note 120, at 371-86 (arguing that the random nature of juror
awareness of mandatory minimum sentences raises issues of due process and equal protection).
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reevaluating whether this information should not be provided to them in
all cases becomes more pressing.
C. THE SECRECY OF JURY DELIBERATIONS
Jury verdicts are one of the most mysterious artifacts of the
adversarial system. While the system has plenty to say about what the
jury can and cannot know, a jury's verdicts, once rendered, are "largely
immune from challenge or review."' 2  Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),
and most of its state counterparts, forbid jurors from testifying about
their deliberations or mental processes. 26 This rule was given an
expansive reading by the Supreme Court in Tanner v. United States,
which held that Rule 6o6(b) foreclosed a hearing into juror allegations
that their fellow jurors had used marijuana, cocaine, and copious
amounts of alcohol during the trial."' Congress has even made it a
federal crime to record jury deliberations in a federal court."'
Traditionally, the purpose of these rules is to encourage full and free
discussion inside the jury room. As Justice Cardozo warned, "[f]reedom
of debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors
were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely
published to the world."' In addition, some consider the inscrutability of
jury verdicts to be a critical factor supporting the system's legitimacy. 3 o
By hiding the jury's reasons for its verdict and the methods by which it
arrived at its decision, reducing all that has gone before to a series of
"crisp and impregnable verdicts," the system promotes the public
acceptability of its fact finding."3
125. George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 579 (997). In criminal
cases, jury verdicts of acquittal are insulated from review by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896). Verdicts of
conviction can only be invalidated if a reviewing court, taking the facts established in the light most
favorable to the government, determines that no reasonable jury could have convicted. United States
v. Howard, 235 F.3d 366,373 (8th Cir. 2ooo).
126. See FED. R. EVID. 6o6(b) (barring, with limited exceptions, testimony of jurors to impeach that
jury's verdict).
127. 483 U.S. t07, 122-25 (1987).
128. i8 U.S.C. § 1508 (2oo6).
129. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
130. See Fisher, supra note 125, at 705 ("The jury's secrecy is an aid to legitimacy, for the privacy
of the jury box shrouds the shortcomings of its methods."); Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and
Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1195 (1979) ("The trial system
presents the jurors with an array of facts, assertions, contradictions, and ambiguities, and then obtains
a verdict difficult to disagree with because the secrecy of the jurors' deliberations and the general
nature of the verdict make it hard to know precisely on what it was based."). But see Akhil Reed
Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. rI69, 1187 (1995) (arguing
that "inscrutability and muteness are not the essence of juries" and that juries should be invited to give
reasons for their verdicts if they wish).
131. Fisher, supra note 125, at 581.
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But the blogging jurors who post tidbits complaining about how
they are going to have to "listen to the local riff-raff try and convince me
of their innocence"' do little to maintain the "crisp and impregnable"
qualities of jury verdicts.' When even a superior court judge, empaneled
as a juror in a murder case, thinks it appropriate to email his fellow
judges to inform them, "[h]ere I am livin' the dream, jury duty with
[defense counsel] Mugridge and [prosecutor] Jenkins,"" the public
confidence in the secret workings of the jury can reasonably be
undermined. We know that jurors are human: they are picked because
they are supposed to reflect the conscience of the community. But when
the nameless, faceless jurors suddenly burst into the public consciousness
with inane tweets, their mystique is jeopardized.
For the most part, the dispatches from the jury box seem fairly
harmless and do not appear to implicate any substantial rights of the
defendant.'35 In the federal corruption trial of former Pennsylvania state
senator Vincent Fumo, one juror posted to his Facebook page at the
conclusion of deliberations on a Frida.7, "Stay tuned for the big
announcement on Monday everyone!""' The judge denied Fumo's
motion for a new trial.' In the mayor of Baltimore's recent
embezzlement trial, five of the jurors became Facebook friends during
the trial and chatted about the case online. '1 In two separate cases in
which defense counsel are currently attempting to subpoena errant
jurors' Facebook records, the only comments made public so far have
been that the jurors found portions of the testimony boring.'39 Overall,
132. See Vesna Jaksic, A New Headache for Courts: Blogging Jurors, NAT'L L.J. (Mar. 12, 2007),
http://www.1aw.com/jsplPubArticle.jsp?id= 9 oooo 5 4 7 6512 (quoting what one prospective juror, who
became jury foreman, wrote on his blog four days before jury selection).
133. Fisher, supra note 125, at 581.
134. E-mail from James Oppliger to Hilary Chittick et al. (Mar. 16, 2010, 3:51 PM), available at
http://fresnocriminaldefense.com/wp-content/uploads/20ol/o 4 /oppliger-emais-o 4 2Olo.pdf. The defendant
was quick to move for a new trial based on juror misconduct. See Pablo Lopez, Judge/Juror Emails Stir
Up Fresno Murder Verdict, FRESNO BEE (Apr. 15, 20o), available at 20oo WLNR 7799009.
135. See Michael Bromby, The Temptation to Tweet-Jurors' Activities Outside the Trial (Mar.
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Institute for Advanced Studies, Glasgow), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=159oo 47. The author conducted a weeklong study of Twitter users who
mentioned "jury duty" or "jury service." Id. at t. Although some of the users tweeted during their jury
duty, most of the tweets were innocuous comments about boredom and lack of refreshments. Id. at 2-
4. Only two of the users arguably touched on the merits. One tweeted, "Yay! Jury duty!...That guy
looks so guilty!!" Id. at 4. The other tweeted, "Week 8 of jury service. Now am in the not-so-fun part
of returning a verdict. Are they gulity? [sic] I don't knooooooooow :(" Id. at 5.
136. United States v. Fumo, No. 06-319, 2009 WL 1688482, at *61-62 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2009).
137. Id. at *67.
138. See Julie Bykowicz, 5 Dixon Jurors Recalled as Witnesses, BALT. SUN, Dec. 30, 2009, at 2A.
Ultimately, the mayor, Sheila Dixon, abandoned her motion for a new trial and pled guilty to a perjury
charge. See Julie Bykowicz, Dixon Resigns, BALT. SUN, Jan. 7, 20oo, at IA.
139. See Andy Furillo, Defense in Sacramento Assault Case Subpoenas Juror's Facebook Postings,
SACRAMENTo BEE, Nov. I8, 20io, http://www.sacbee.com/20O/li/i8/v-mobile/3194312/defense-in-
sacramento-assault.html (discussing a motion for new trial that quoted a juror's postings stating "can it
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these incidents just appear to serve as new, if flimsy, arguments on
appeal.4
On the other hand, at least one social media posting has made clear
that the juror had made up her mind before the case was over. When a
juror from Detroit posted that it was "gonna be fun to tell the defendant
they're GUILTY" on her Facebook page before the defense case had
even started, the judge removed her from the jury, fined her $250, and
ordered her to write a five-page essay on the Sixth Amendment. 4'
In a murder trial in Ventura County, California, the jury foreman
was held in contempt for blogging about the trial during the taking of
evidence and deliberations, posting a photograph of the murder weapon,
and hosting a chat room in which people could ask him questions about
the case.'" In a burglary case in San Diego, the defendant's conviction
was vacated and remanded for a hearing on juror misconduct after it was
discovered that the jury foreman had blogged about his fellow jurors and
their deliberations. 43 The foreman, who had also failed to mention that
he was a lawyer,'" wrote about the proceedings in detail, complete with
descriptions of the physical appearance and mannerisms of his fellow
jurors,'45 and a blow-by-blow account of the deliberations.46 On remand,
however, the judgment was reinstated on the grounds that the state had
rebutted the presumption of prejudice.47
There appear to be several issues at stake here. The first is that juror
blog postings, status updates, and tweets might chill robust discussion
inside the jury room. Jurors could potentially feel inhibited from
participating too actively, out of concern that they might become the
get any more BORING (than) going over piles and piles of (cell) phone records... uugggghhhhhh");
Alexandra Zayas, No Friends of Justice, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Oct. 29, 20Io, at iB (describing how
the jury foreman in Florida rape case, whose Facebook records are now under subpoena, "updated her
Facebook page calling testimony 'boring, boring, boring"' while trial was ongoing).
140. Compared to the subsequent revelation that another of the jurors in Vincent Fumo's trial
learned that he had previously been charged and convicted of corruption in 1980, the "Stay tuned for
the big announcement on Monday everyone!" concern seems relatively trivial. See Robert Moran,
Funo Lawyers File Brief Seeking New Trial, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. I 1, 2011, at B I.
141. See Ed White, Juror Hadley Jons Punished for Posting Verdict on Facebook, HUFFINGTON
PosT (Sept. 2, 20oo), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20o/o9/o2/hadley-jons-juror-punishe-n_7o3877.html.
142. Raul Hernandez, Juror Held in Contempt for Blog of Murder Trial, VENTURA CNTY. STAR, Jan.
23, 2oo8, http://www.vcstar.com/news/2oo8/jan/23/juror-held-in-contempt-for-blog-of-murder-trial/.
143. People v. McNeely, No. Do48692, 2007 WL 1723711, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 14, 2007).
144. Id. at *3 n.3 (quoting the juror's blog, in which he wrote, "I quickly iterated my occupation
(project manager for technology company, which is more neutral than lawyer, don't ya think?)").
145. The cast of characters included "Emily, the pretty teacher to my left," who spoke "softly but
passionately," Amanda, "the shy, young girl across the table," and the foreman's antagonist Brad, a
"confident, muscular skinhead character with a carefully shaven goatee," who the foreman "had
unease about since seeing him lope down the hallway on day one." Id. at *3.
146. Id.
147. See People v. McNeely, No. Do526o6, 2009 WL 428561, at *I (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2009).
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subject of a fellow juror's blog post. 8There is, as of yet, no evidence that
this has occurred.
The second issue is that jurors could use the Internet to solicit
outside opinions. While a serious violation of the jurors' oath, this seems
to have occurred only a handful of times. In one case that enchanted the
British tabloids, a juror on a sex abuse case couldn't decide whether the
defendants were guilty.'49 During deliberations, she posted the salient
facts of the case on her Facebook page and wrote, "I don't know which
way to go, so I'm holding a poll.".o Some of her Facebook friends replied
with guilty verdicts."' In a murder trial in Indiana, a juror posted the
following status update on his Facebook page: "jury duty; day one
complete."5 . One of his friends commented, "Guilty, next."'53 The juror
was admonished by the court, but not dismissed, and the trial continued
to a guilty verdict.5 4
The third is that dispatches from the "black box" of the jury room'
subvert the gravity of the process."' This appears to mirror the concerns
some commentators have raised about postverdict interviews with jurors,
that "if the media continue to reveal the contents of jury deliberations,
there is a genuine risk that the authority of jury verdicts will decline."'
148. See, e.g., McNeely, 2007 WL 1723711, at *4 (jury foreman complained on his blog that by
threatening to vote not guilty on one of the counts, "skinhead Brad threatened to torpedo" two of the
other counts "in his quest for tyrannical jurisprudence").
149. See Guy Patrick, Juror Axed for Verdict Poll on Net, SUN (U.K.), Nov. 24, 2oo8,
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/article 1963544.ece.
150. Id.
151. See id. The juror was dismissed from the case, and the trial continued with eleven jurors. See id.
152. Lydia X. McCoy, Starks Juror Admonished, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Oct. 1o, 2009, at AT.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Although so commonplace as to be almost a clich6, the origins of the phrase are obscure. The
earliest use of the expression I was able to find was by Thomas Cowan in 1963. "If we were to adopt
the lingo of the system theorists for a moment we could put the matter this way," he wrote. "There is
an immense and complicated Input into the judicial Decision-Maker which we can observe. We also
can observe the Output in the form of the Decision and all the effects of it that we care to observe.
The judicial Decision-Maker is the Black Box between Input and Output." Thomas A. Cowan,
Decision Theory in Law, Science, and Technology, 17 RUrGERs L. REV. 499, 5o8 (1963). The earliest
court decision using the term appears to be Freshwater v. Booth, 233 S.E.2d 312, 318 (W. Va. 1977).
156. This concern was aptly lampooned by the comedian Steve Martin when he was called for jury
duty. On December 20, 20o0, his Twitter followers were treated to the following updates:
REPORT FROM JURY DUTY: defendant looks like a murderer. GUILTY. Waiting for
opening remarks.
... REPORT FROM JURY DUTY: guy I thought was up for murder turns out to be
defense attorney. I bet he murdered someone anyway.
... REPORT FROM JURY DUTY: Prosecuting attorney. Don't like his accent. Serbian?
Going with INNOCENT. We're five minutes in.
Brian Grow, Live from the Jury Box, It's Steve Martin!, REUTERs, Dec. 22, 20o0, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2olo/12/22/us-stevemartin-twitter-idUSTRE6BL3402OI222.
157. Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Post-Verdict Interviews,
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 297.
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If the linchpin of the jury's legitimacy is that their verdicts are
opaque, so all mistakes are hidden from sight, the fact that increasing
numbers of jurors are blogging may change the calculus that keeps jury
decisionmaking secret."' Whether we are really ready to see what is
behind the curtain-the petty rivalries, potential misapprehension of
evidence, and irrelevant matter the jurors actually considered-is open
to question. But if jurors themselves begin to expose their deliberative
process, possibly even in real time, there could be a genuine challenge to
the traditional view that jury verdicts should never be explained.
D. IMPROPER CONTACT WITH JURORS
Unlike the foregoing set of rules, norms barring improper contact
are uncontroversial -indeed, it is hard to imagine any set of
circumstances in which ex parte communications between jurors and
parties would be a positive thing. The reason "[p]rivate communications,
possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or
the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden,"'. is simply because such
encounters are not subject to "confrontation, cross-examination, or other
safeguards" fundamental to a fair trial.'" Any such communications will
"invalidate the verdict, unless their harmlessness is" demonstrated. 6'
Accordingly, in several early cases, the Court reversed convictions
where an officer of the court made comments to the jury regarding the
defendant's guilt. In Mattox v. United States, a bailiff said in the presence
and hearing of the jury, "This is the third fellow [the defendant] has
killed."'6 The Court held that the bailiff's misconduct, given the fact that
he was in charge of the jury and that the defendant was on trial for
murder, could not "have been otherwise than prejudicial," and directed
that a new trial be granted.'6 ' In Parker v. Gladden, a bailiff stated to one
of the jurors, referring to the defendant, "Oh that wicked fellow[], he is
guilty."'6 Regardless of whether the bailiff's comments actually had a
prejudicial effect, the Court wrote, "we believe that the unauthorized
conduct of the bailiff 'involves such a probability that prejudice will
result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process.""
158. "Maybe the law needs to be amended to accommodate blogs," wrote a blogging juror. "No
doubt this sort of thing happened and happens a lot on a smaller scale (juror to friend, relative over
dinner), and no one learns of it." John Eligan & Rebecca White, A Juror's Blog Chronicle Stirs an
Age-Old Question, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 20io, at A32.
159. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892).
16o. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363,364 (1966) (per curiam).
161. Mattox, 385 U.S. at 150.
162. Id. at 142.
163. Id. at 151.
164. 385 U.S. at 363.
165. Id. at 365 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965)). Justice Harlan, unconvinced
that the statements of the "apparently Elizabethan-tongued bailiff" had any prejudicial effect,
dissented. Id. at 367 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Apart from their prejudicial character, statements such as these
contravene the rule discussed above,'" that "the 'evidence developed'
against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public
courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right
of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel."' 6 In addition,
overly cozy relationships between jurors and parties can undermine
impartiality. In the notorious example of Turner v. Louisiana, a jury was
sequestered during a three-day capital murder trial and in the charge of
several sheriff's deputies.'6 The deputies drove the jurors to and from
their hotel, ran errands for them, had meals with them, and made phone
calls for them."' Two of these deputies were also the State's principal
witnesses against Turner."o As the Court observed, this was not a brief
encounter, but "a continuous and intimate association throughout a
three-day trial."' Given the "extreme prejudice inherent in this
continual association throughout the trial between the jurors and these
two key witnesses for the prosecution," the Court found that Turner had
been deprived of a fair trial."'
Compared to these cases, reported instances of online contact have
been fairly mild.' Where once a juror might have sent a love letter to
the prosecutor, enclosing a photo and a poem,'74 she now employs the
more expedient process of sending a friend request. Some courts have
nonetheless taken these contacts seriously. In West Virginia, the fraud
conviction of a sheriff's deputy was reversed on appeal after it was
discovered that one of the jurors had "friended" the defendant on
Myspace shortly before the trial, a fact she failed to mention during voir
dire."
166. See supra Part I.A.I.
167. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965).
168. Id. at 467-68.
169. Id. at 468.
170. Id. at 467-68.
171. Id. at 473.
172. Id.
173. As Nancy King points out, some forms of improper contact were probably more prevalent in
earlier times, when jurors sometimes had to share accommodations with the parties. See King, supra
note 28, at 2709 nL131 (citing Louisville & Nashville Railway Co. v. Turney, 62 So. 885, 888-89 (Ala.
1913), in which the jurors shared a bed, then a room at a boardinghouse, with the plaintiff during trial).
174. See United States v. Beltempo, 675 F.2d 472, 481 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing a juror who wrote
a love letter during trial to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, inviting her to lunch or dinner).
175. See Ry Rivard, Web Stirs Problens in Jury Selection, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, June 18, 20I0,
at IA. Presumably the defendant had not mentioned this fact to his counsel either, in the hope that the
juror would vote in his favor. This is not unprecedented. In a case that occurred years before the
advent of the Internet, a juror met the defendant outside the courthouse during a trial recess,
accompanied him to his home, met the defendant's wife and children, and had a beer. State v. Adams,
555 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). The court found that the defendant had suffered no
prejudice from the incident, since he deliberately did not mention it to the judge or his lawyer until
after his conviction, apparently in the belief that the friendly juror would vote to acquit. Id. at 361.
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In contrast, a Bronx court refused to grant a new trial in a criminal
negligence case where a juror sent a Facebook friend request to a
firefighter witness after deliberations began.',6 The firefighter, not
recognizing the juror by name, failed to respond."' The day after the
verdict, the juror renewed her request and sent the firefighter a message
explaining who she was; the two then became Facebook friends."' The
court refused to grant a new trial on grounds of jury misconduct, on the
basis that the improper conduct of the juror did not prejudice a
substantial right of the defendants.7 9 Although the court noted that the
juror's conduct was a serious breach of her obligations as a juror, it
rejected the defense's argument that the juror's possibly romantic
"feelings" towards the firefighter tainted the verdict.'so
Finally, there are now more ways to "bump into" parties
inadvertently. For example, a juror on a medical malpractice case was
sent a "match" by an online dating site to which she subscribed; when she
checked the profile, the proposed suitor turned out to be the medical
expert whose testimony she had recently heard.'"' The more people are
linked through a complex of contacts, listservs, dating databases, and
friend pages, the more likely these chance encounters become, causing
not only the embarrassment of seeing trial participants in unexpected
contexts but also possible prejudice to the parties. Who could take an
expert seriously after learning that he is looking for "that special
someone?"
It is true that so far, such friend requests and dating matches have
not presented a serious threat to the fairness of the proceedings.
Nonetheless, technology has facilitated these types of impermissible
contacts, lowering the embarrassment factor, making it easier to get in
touch, and encouraging secrecy, at least so long as both parties keep the
encounter quiet. Studies suggest that computer-mediated communications
increase the phenomenon of disinhibition and encourage poor
judgment.'"" If this is so, then improper communications between jurors
and parties could be a growing problem.
176. People v. Rios, No. 12oolo6, 2010 WL 625221, at *2 (N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010). The case arose out
of the deaths of two New York firefighters. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at *3.
179. Id. at *3-4. The court did, however, set aside the jury's verdict on the basis of insufficiency of
the evidence. Id. at *14.
18o. Id. at *4 ("Defendants failed to elicit any testimony to establish what exactly Ms. Krell's
'feelings' were or how any 'feelings' implicit in her friend request affected the jury's deliberations in
any way.").
181. See Talk of the Nation, supra note 59. Emily, a caller into the show, had recently been a juror
in a medical malpractice case when the medical expert from the trial "showed up in my online dating
site inbox as somebody I should date." Id. She noted that the trial was over at that point, but that "it
could have very well happened during the trial." Id.
182. See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
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E. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: LAWYERS INVESTIGATING JURORS
Jurors themselves are subject to a shocking amount of online
intrusion. The value of the Internet, particularly social networking sites,
in providing a much more intimate view of the jurors has not escaped the
attention of trial lawyers.'8' Background checks on jurors are becoming
commonplace, particularly in high-profile or violent crime cases.'8 In
some cases, this uncovers juror dishonesty,"' but most of the time it is
simply a way for lawyers to mine for information that they can use to
exercise peremptory challenges or to increase their jury appeal.'6 Some
lawyers are coming to court for jury selection armed with a phalanx of
paralegals to run each juror's name through a variety of social media
searches in real time.'
Ever more intrusive searches are recommended as an enhancement
to jury selection, including searching the county sheriff's online arrest
records, "obtaining the exact dollar amounts and dates of a juror's recent
contributions to political campaigns," and using Google Street View to
see jurors' front yards.'" As one trial lawyer gloated, "[I]magine the
potential impact of a well-placed metaphor in your closing argument
tailored to a juror's interests or social views as described on Facebook or
Twitter."'8
183. See Christopher B. Hopkins, Internet Social Networking Sites for Lawyers, 28 TRIAL ADvoc.
Q. 12, 13 (2009).
184. See Anne Constable, Background Checks of Jurors Routine, NEW MEXICAN, Sept. 24, 2009, at
A4. One trial consultant was quoted in the article as saying that "if this became standard practice, you
would do great damage to the willingness of most citizens to participate in jury duty." Id.
185. See, e.g., Julie Kay, Vetting Jurors via MySpace: Social Websites Contain a Trove of Data for
Attorneys, in LMGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: LITIGATION 87, 89
(2oo9) (citing an incident in Jose Padilla case in which lawyers discovered that a juror had lied on her
questionnaire by saying she had no experience with the criminal justice system, whereas in fact she was
being investigated for malfeasance).
186. See, e.g., Hopkins, supra note 183, at 13 ("Even if a jury is selected in a matter of hours,
continued Internet research during the trial may reveal interests, backgrounds, and social/political
opinions which should help a lawyer target themes of the case and closing argument to resonate with
that particular jury."); Brian Grow, Internet v. Courts: Googling for the Perfect Juror, REUTERS, Feb.
17, 20IH, available at http://us.mobile.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSTRE 7 1G4 VW2o 10217(noting that online vetting can enable lawyers to "bypass court-imposed restrictions on voir dire").
187. See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, Lawyer Uses Web to Sort Through Jury Pool, ABA J. MAG.,
July 20Io, available at http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/tech-check/. One trial lawyer
recommends getting an extra copy of the prospective juror list for the paralegal, and that "[wihile the
judge and the plaintiff's lawyer begin questioning the potential jurors, the paralegal should sit
unnoticed in the corner or in the hallway with the laptop and run the names on the juror list" through
a series of Internet searches. Hopkins, supra note 183, at 13.
188. Hopkins, supra note 183, at 13.
189. Id. Hopkins also suggests seventeen Internet searches for counsel to run on prospective
jurors, including Google Street View, photosharing sites, and blog searches, and then notes, "since the
foregoing seventeen Internet searches are fairly invasive, a careful lawyer should avoid overt
references to a juror's personal information during jury selection and trial." Id. at 14; see also Kay,
supra note 185, at 92 (describing lawyer who discovered from a juror's Myspace page that one of his
favorite books was The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People and wove the reference into his closing
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What is particularly objectionable is the fact that this process is
conducted by stealth. As one jury consultant put it, "You don't want to
tip off jurors so that they know you've been investigating them."" As
these tactics become standard,' one wonders how long prospective
jurors will remain unaware of them. If jurors begin to realize that jury
duty entails not only the inconvenience of taking time off of work and
other obligations' but also involves wholesale intrusion into their online
lives, it might do "great damage to the willingness of most citizens to
participate in jury duty."'" Conversely, jurors may feel entitled to do a
bit of research of their own just to balance the scales.
II. CURRENT LEGAL RESPONSES-AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
As this issue is still emergent, legal responses are in their early
stages and rely primarily on jury instructions. Requiring jurors to turn in
their cell phones in the courtroom does not address what happens when
jurors go home at night. Sequestration is impractical, expensive, and
would make jury duty even more unpopular than it is now. Ultimately,
this Part argues, given the compelling nature of the Internet, none of
these responses may be sufficient to turn the tide. Given the outlook for
the future, it may take more to convince jurors to put down their iPhones
than simply telling them to stop.
A. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The first response that comes to mind when addressing any
problematic jury behavior is simply to tell jurors not to do it. As one
state court observed, "[G]iven the simplicity, speed, and scope of
Internet searches, allowing a juror to access with ease extraneous
information about the law and the facts, trial judges are well advised to
reference Internet searches specifically when they instruct jurors not to
conduct their own research or investigations."'"
Most jurisdictions have done exactly that.' In December 2009, the
Federal Judicial Conference issued proposed model jury instructions that
admonished jurors not to research the case online and to refrain from
engaging in any social networking:
argument).
190. Kay, supra note 185, at 92.
191. This strategy is not limited to defense lawyers. See Laura B. Martinez, District Attorney to Use
Facebook Profiles in Jury Selection, BRowNsvr.LE HERALD, Jan. 17, 2011, httpJ/www.brownsvilleherald.com/
articles/district-12I729-attorney-use.html.
192. See Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLo. L. REV. 53,61-62 (2001).
193. See Constable, supra note 184 (quoting trial consultant).
194. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 828 N.E.2d 556, 568 n.ii (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
195. A recent survey of state court judges revealed that fifty-six percent of judges "report routine
juror instructions that include some component about new media use during trial." CCPIO REPORT,
supra note 30, at 66.
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You may not use any electronic device or media, such as a telephone,
cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry or computer; the internet,
any internet service, or any text or instant messaging service; or any
internet chat room, blog, or website such as Facebook, My Space,
Linkedln, YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to anyone any
information about this case or to conduct any research about this
case.'9
Many states have done the same,97 and a number of other jurisdictions
are considering similar instructions."' There have also been calls for
sterner, more frequently repeated instructions, 99 or a requirement thatjurors sign declarations, under penalty of perjury, that they will not
conduct any online research." Nonetheless, this is unlikely to be the end
of the matter.
One argument against instructions is that they do not work: in a
sizeable minority of cases in which a juror's Internet research was
revealed, the juror had conducted the research in flagrant disregard of
the judge's instructions.o' "I don't know how much clearer I can say it,"
196. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., PROPOSED MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: THE USE OF ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON OR COMMUNICATE
ABOUT A CASE (2009).
197. See, e.g., HAW. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 2.01 (2010) ("You are not permitted
to search the Internet, for example, using Google, or any other search engine or web site to look for
information about this case or about the participants in the trial.... Do not share information,
opinions, or anything else about this case with others, personally or in writing, or through computers,
cell phone messaging, personal electronic and media devices or other forms of wireless
communications. This includes, for example, communicating about this case through e-mail, instant
messaging, tweeting, text messaging, or using the Internet in any way."); MONT. CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 1-lo (2oo9) ("You must not consult any books, dictionaries, encyclopedias, research
online, using Google, Yahoo, Bing, or any other Internet search engine."); N.J. CIVIL JURY CHARGE
§ I.IIC (2010) ("You... should not attempt to communicate with others about the case, either
personally or through computers, cell phones, text messaging, instant messaging, blogs, Twitter,
Facebook, Myspace, personal electronic and media devices or other forms of wireless
communication."). The National Center for State Courts lists an additional twelve states-Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Michigan, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah,
Washington, and Wisconsin-that specifically reference social media in their jury instructions. Social
Media and the Courts, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE Crs., http://www.ncsc.org/topics/media-relations/
social-media-and-the-courts/state-links.aspxcat=Jury% 2olnstructions% 2oon%2oSocial% 2oMedia
(last visited July 4, 2011).
198. See, e.g., A Jury of Your TWITS: Social Media Wreaks Havoc in the Courtroom, WINNIPEG
FREE PRESS, Jan. 9, 2011, at A2o (noting arguments for judges in Canada to devise guidelines to
address juror use of social media); Lorraine Davidson, Googling Jurors Who Research Cases at Home
Put Fair Trials in Jeopardy, TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 21, 2009, at 3 (describing calls for jury instructions in
Scotland); Twitter "Threatens" Trial by Jury, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 20, 2oo, available at
2010 WLNR 23153821 (describing demand from Lord Chief Justice that judges inform jurors "in
unequivocal terms from the very outset of trial" of the consequences of misusing the Internet).
199. See Douglas L. Keene & Rita R. Handrich, Online and Wired for Justice: Why Jurors Turn to
the Internet, 21 JURY EXPERT 14, 20 (2009).
200. See id.; see also Cheryl Miller, New Bill Targets Web-Surfing Jurors, S.F. RECORDER, Feb. 22,
20o0, at I (describing recent California legislation penalizing jurors who access external information).
201. See, e.g., Carmen Juri, Mistrial Declared in Killing of Boy, 73 Jurors Saw Story on Star-Ledger
Website, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), May 25, 2oo, at 30 (describing case in which jurors had viewed
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fumed one state court judge after declaring a mistrial in response to a
juror researching the penalty online. "We just lost 3 1/2 days of court
time because somebody couldn't follow my instructions.,2o2
Courts generally operate on the assumption that jurors will abide by
legal instructions.2 o3 However, as Justice Scalia has recognized, that rule
"is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the
presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable
practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant
in the criminal justice process."2 o4
The psychological literature and empirical studies show that jurors
frequently misunderstand instructions.o" As Jerome Frank memorably
wrote, "[T]welve men can easily misunderstand more law in a minute
than the judge can explain in an hour.,26 The Internet, with its virtual
connections that seem almost-but not quite-real, confuses jurors
further. The juror in West Virginia who had "friended" the defendant on
Myspace shortly before trial2" did not appear to understand that the
judge's admonition to disclose any relationship with the parties applied
to her. "I just didn't feel like I really knew him," she explained.2'
news article on a cell phone in the jury room and the judge ruled that they were not reliable and could
not follow the instructions of the court); John Monk, Juror Misconduct Alleged in Federal Cockfighting
Case, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), May 27, 20oo, available at 20o0 WLNR io891869 ("[O]ne juror had
defied the judge's numerous orders not to surf the Internet to do independent research about the
case."); Siegel, supra note 41 ("[Olne juror had been doing online research into the case despite the
judge's order not to read news accounts or otherwise investigate the crime."); see also Usman Azad,
Internet Map Subject of Appeal, KALGOORLIE MINER (VY. Austl.), Nov. 23, 20IO, at 3 (describing how
juror in murder case had downloaded aerial maps of murder location-and made fourteen copies to
hand out to fellow jurors-despite fact that judge had "specifically warned the jury not to go 'on the
internet and try to find out something ... about the case"').
202. Rivas, supra note I17 (quoting Superior Court Judge J.B. Allen, Jr.).
203. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 740 (1993) (noting that courts presume that jurors
follow instructions from the court); Rodriguez v. Colorado, 498 U.S. 1055, 1058 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("As a matter of convention, we presume that jurors follow jury instructions.").
204. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
205. See, e.g., Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to
Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 3o LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 469,475 (2oo6) (reviewing
prior studies with a combined 8,474 participants).
2o6. Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 6o (2d Cir. 1948). This continues to be a
problem today. The jurors in the corruption trial of former Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich were
overwhelmed by the complexity of the instructions they received. "It was like, 'Here's a manual, go fly
the space shuttle,"' complained one of the jurors of the over loo-page tome they were given. Monica
Davey & Susan Saulny, Jurors Fault Complexity of the Blagojevich Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2oo, at
Ai.
207. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
2o8. Rivard, supra note 175; see also Keene & Handrich, supra note 199, at 16 ("[I]n virtually every
case [of juror misconduct on the Internet], the violator is usually very sincere that their intent was




Worse, these studies suggest that jurors do not always follow
instructions, even when they do understand them.2" One problem is thatjurors may resist instructions when those instructions clash with their
innate sense of justice."o Jurors want to do the right thing, and seeking
out extrajudicial information is sometimes their way of making sure that
they reach the right result." While the law defines a fair trial within a
due process model that seeks to protect the individual from illegitimate
conviction through procedural safeguards,.. "due process is not the jury's
main concern. Ask any juror what his or her objective is, and the answer
will be to come up with the right decision."2 1 3
Another problem is that jurors may react negatively to what they
perceive to be a restriction on their decisionmaking freedom.2 4 This can
make them value the forbidden evidence or practice all the more, a
process referred to as psychological reactance."' In combination with
some jurors' distrust of lawyers,"' this can goad potential jurors into
wanting to verify facts for themselves, regardless of instructions.
B. CONFISCATION, SEQUESTRATION, FINES AND CONTEMPT
While a comprehensive solution would appear to be simply to
separate jurors from their electronic devices, this is unlikely to be
effective. Because so few trials proceed from jury selection to verdict in a
209. See, e.g., Greene & Dodge, supra note 71, at 76 (finding that judge's limiting instructions were
ineffective in guiding the jurors' use of prior criminal record evidence); Steblay, supra note 205, at 487("[I1t is clear that judicial instructions do not effectively eliminate jurors' use of inadmissible
evidence."); Wissler & Saks, supra note 71, at 47 (finding that presentation of a defendant's prior
criminal record affects the likelihood of conviction, which a judge's limiting instruction would not fix).
210. See Steblay, supra note 2o5, at 473. The author explains that most jurors are motivated to
reach a just verdict, therefore "jurors can be expected to rely on inadmissible evidence, despite
instruction to the contrary, if it is seen as reliable and probative from the juror's perspective." Id.
211. See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES III (1988). They add, "Precisely because juries want to make correct
decisions, they find it difficult to resist the temptation to use information that is not in the trial
record." Id. The juror who caused a mistrial because she researched retinal detachment, see supra note
51, was not motivated by an improper purpose, said her lawyer: "Her sole intent was being the most
conscientious juror that she could be. It just happened to get sidetracked a little." Michael R. Sisak,Support for Juror No. ii, THE CITIZEN'S VOICE (Wilkes-Barre, Pa.), Jan. 16,2o1II, http://citizensvoice.com/
news/support-for-juror-no- i-i.lo98t#axzziQLqdbSmu.
212. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 163-68 (1968).
213. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 211, at no. The authors add that, "as a general rule, thejury defines justice in terms of the accuracy of an outcome." Id.
214. See id. at io9. "Telling the jury that it must disregard evidence is, to them, a form of
censorship," the authors write; "[w]hen information is banned, people assume it is important and are
persuaded by it." Id.
215. See SHARON. S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM
AND CONTROL 2-4 (1981).
216. Green, supra note 19, at 703 ("[Exclusionary evidentiary rules] have the unintended, and
perhaps ironic, result of encouraging the jury's distrust of lawyers. The rules do so by fostering the
perception that lawyers are deliberately withholding evidence.").
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single day, 2 " even jurors who must turn in their cell phones when they
enter the courthouse can always check their computers when they go
home at night.
The same problem applies to sequestration. While there have been a
few calls for sequestration of the jury, particularly from editorial writers
218in need of a punchy headline, such drastic measures are prohibitively
expensive and impractical.2 9 Even setting aside the expense, it seems
unwise to make jury service more unpalatable than it is now. 20 jury
service is a funny thing: we sing its praises as an opportunity for
democratic participation, as a bulwark of individual liberty, as the crown
jewel in our criminal justice system,"' but then the summons arrives and
our enthusiasm evaporates. There is little doubt that if jurors were forced
to sit idly in courtrooms, unable to contact work except by payphone,
and then were separated from friends and family for the duration of
every trial, large numbers of people would refuse to participate.
A few courts, particularly in England, have held jurors in contempt,
or subjected them to fines.2 While this could serve as an effective
217. See King, supra note 28, at 2709 (noting that most felony trials take three days or longer to
complete).
218. For some reason, this seems to be a particularly popular option in Australia. See, e.g., Chris
Nyst, www.Verdict Inadmissible, GOLD COAST BULL. (Austl.), June 5, 20oo, at 32 ("Perhaps the only
answer left will be to ... cloister[] our juries safely behind closed doors, with mobile phones and other
access to the internet strictly denied."); Op-Ed., Protect Our Jury System, SUNDAY HERALD SUN
(Austl.), May 9, 20oo, at 90 ("[If jurors cannot be trusted to distance themselves from technology
while judging their peers, perhaps consideration should be given to isolating, or sequestering, jury
members until the trial is completed.").
219. See Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 63, o5-o9 (1996) (noting that
sequestration poses a "significant" financial burden on the state and adverse psychological effects on
jurors); see also King, supra note 28, at 2713-14 (tracing the demise of sequestration as a method of
juror control).
220. This fact has been acknowledged for over 15o years. See, e.g., Stephens v. People, 19 N.Y. 549,
554 (1859) ("[I]f the ancient rule forbidding the separation of jurors, during a trial, should be enforced
at the present day, the public would lose the services of the most reliable jurors.").
221. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. t, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (referring to the right to jury trial as "the spinal column of American democracy");
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) ("A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants
in order to prevent oppression by the Government."); Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political
Participation Akin to Voting, so CORNELL L. REv. 203, 218 (1995) (observing that jury service has been
considered since the time of the Founders "one of the fundamental prerequisites to majoritarian self-
government").
222. See, e.g., Nigel Freedman, Sussex Juror Fined for Researching Court Case on Internet, ARGUS
(U.K.), Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.theargus.co.uk/news/46328I2.Sussex-jurorfinedforresearching_
courtcase on-internet/. In the United Kingdom, the Contempt of Court Act of 1981 provides that
"obtain[ing], disclos[ing] or solicit[ing] any particulars of statements made, opinions expressed,
arguments advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations in any legal
proceedings" is an offense punishable by up to two years imprisonment. Contempt of Court Act, 1981,
c. 49 §§ 8, 14 (Eng.). This did not stop a juror in the perjury trial of a Scottish politician from ranting
on her Facebook page that her fellow jurors were a bunch of "scumbags" for finding the politician
guilty. See Jonathan Brocklebank, Sheridan Case Juror "Could Face Jail" over Online Rant, DAILY
MAIL (U.K.), Jan. 10, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 537489.
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deterrent, it might also lead to less reporting. There is reason to suspect
widespread underreporting of juror misconduct, as it does not come to
the attention of the court in the first place unless a juror comes forward
and admits her own wrongdoing or informs on one of her colleagues."3
Most people try to avoid overt conflict," and if jurors knew they were
potentially inflicting financial consequences on each other by alerting the
court, they might be more hesitant to come forward. On balance, it seems
that any marginal deterrent value would be outweighed by the potential
for deliberations to be adversely affected by increased mistrust and
resentment among jurors.
C. THE SIREN SONG OF THE WEB
The main problem with any of the suggested solutions is that they
do not take sufficient account of the compelling nature of the Web. The
Internet has a hold on people that traditional media never had. As one
psychologist put it, "Being highly interactive, computers are much more
captivating than passive media such as television."225 In addition, because
it facilitates interaction across time and obliterates distance, "the virtual
world presents an unreal universe comprised of instant connection and
gratification."226
It is no exaggeration to say that, in the past decade, the Internet has
become "a defining characteristic of our society."2 2' The Internet itself
underwent a profound change even more recently when it transitioned
from its first iteration as an informational and commercial platform to
the interactive and participatory world that is Web 2.0. The launch of
Wikipedia,2 YouTube,2  Facebook,23 o Myspace2 3' and Twitter"' has
223. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Stacy G. Ulbig & Carolyn L. Funk, Conflict Avoidance and Political Participation,
21 POL. BEHAV. 265, 267-68 (1999) (describing social science research and concluding that people tend
to avoid disagreement).
225. MICHAEL G. WESSELLS, COMPUTER, SELF, AND SOCIETY 214 (1990).
226. Ellen Toronto, Time Out of Mind: Dissociation in the Virtual World, 26 PSYCHOANALYTIC
PSYCHOL. II7, 117 (2009).
227. Id. at is ("[The Internet has] altered dramatically the way we do business, access
information, maintain contact, and relate as human beings.").
228. Wikipedia launched in 2001 and now has 18 million articles. WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wikilWikipedia (last visited July 4, 20l).
229. YouTube was launched in February 2005. See The loo Greatest Movies, TV Shows, Albums,
Books, Characters, Scenes, Episodes, Songs, Dresses, Music Videos, and Trends That Entertained Us
Over the Past Ten Years, ENT. WKLY., Dec. II, 2oo9, at 74, 76 (listing YouTube as the third most
entertaining trend from the 200os: "Providing a safe home for piano-playing cats, celeb goof-ups, and
overzealous lip-synchers since 2005.")
230. Facebook was founded in February 2004. Facebook Factsheet, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/presslinfo.php?factsheet (last visited July 4, 2011).
231. Myspace was launched in January 2004. Fact Sheet, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.coml
pressroom/fact-sheet/ (last visited July 4, 201 1).
232. Twitter was launched in July 2oo6. See Aaron Smith & Lee Rainie, 8% of Online Americans
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turned the Internet into a kind of universal companion, to whom people
confide, exhibit themselves, and vent their frustrations in ever-increasing
numbers. Facebook now has over 500 million active users, half of whom
log on every day.233
Internet activity has become so enmeshed in people's everyday lives
that the compulsion to check one's Facebook page can strike even a
burglar-mid-burglary.234 Psychological research has shown that some
people prefer interacting online over face-to-face, on the basis that it
seems easier, less risky, and more exciting.235 For some jurors, it might
simply be impossible to refrain from checking their phones or updating
their Facebook status, and prohibitions on doing so may seem
tantamount to isolating them from the world as they know it.236 This issue
is only more pronounced for the generation of people who are growing
up along with the Internet. Social networking among people under
twenty-five is so ubiquitous that those who make headlines are the social
networking refuseniks, who now "qualify as exotic life forms" out of step
with their generation.' As one teenager explained to her mother, "If
you're not on MySpace, you don't exist."238 Like it or not, the tweeting
teens of today will be the jaded jurors of tomorrow.
In addition, the Internet, by its anonymity and immediacy,
encourages transgressions though the phenomenon of disinhibition,
which leads to impulsive behavior.239 Psychologists have found that
Use Twitter, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, I, 2 (Dec. 9, 201o), http://www.pewintemet.org/-/
media//Files/Reports/20o/PIP-Twitter-Update-20o.pdf.
233. Facebook Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#!/press/info.php?statistics
(last visited July 4, 201). These statistics indicate that 500 million people logged on to Facebook at
least once in the preceeding 3o days. Id. Myspace plays catch-up with more than too million users. Fact
Sheet, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/pressroom/fact-sheet/ (last visited July 4, 2011).
234. Edward Marshall, Burglar Leaves His Facebook Page on Victim's Computer, JOURNAL
(Martinsburg, W. Va.), Sept. 16, 2oo9, http://www.journal-news.net/page/content.detail/id/525232.html.
235. Scott E. Caplan, Preference for Online Social Interaction: A Theory of Problematic Internet
Use and Psychosocial Well-Being, 30 CoMm. REs. 625, 631 (2003).
236. I am not making the claim that most people are "addicted" to the Internet in any clinical
sense. Whether Internet addiction even exists is a matter of controversy within the clinical community,
and it is likely that "if Internet addiction does indeed exist, it affects only a relatively small percentage
of the online population." Laura Widyanto & Mark Griffiths, Internet Addiction: Does It Really Exist?
(Revisited), in PsYCHOLOGY AND THE INTERNET: INTRAPERSONAL, INTERPERSONAL, AND TRANSPERSONAL
IMPLICATIONS I41, 16o-6i (Jayne Gackenbach ed., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
INTERNET]. Nonetheless, many people appear to have some kind of dependency on their favorite
websites. See, John D. Sutter, Twitter Blackout Left Users Feeling "Jittery," "Naked," CNN.com (Aug.
7, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2oo 9 ffECH/o8/o7/twitter.attack.reaction/index.htm (describing panicked
reactions of Twitter users when the site went briefly offline).
237. Ian Shapira, In a Generation That Friends and Tweets, They Don't, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2009,
at Ai. Shapira notes that eighty-five percent of all Internet users aged eighteen to thirty-four visited
Facebook, Myspace or Twitter in August 2oo9, and Facebook's monthly traffic was 92 million. Id.
238. danah boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in
Teenage Social Life, in MACARTHUR FOUNDATION SERIES ON DIGITAL LEARNING: YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND
DIGITAL MEDIA VOLUME II9 (David Buckingham ed., 2007).
239. Jayne Gackenbach & Heather von Stackelberg, Self Online: Personality and Demographic
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people are less inhibited and reveal more about themselves online
because they feel invisible, protected by the Internet's seeming
anonymity.2 4 o It also leads to people exhibiting poor judgment, like thejuror sending a friend request to the firefighter witness.2 4' According to
one psychiatrist, "Deficits in insight and judgment may be especially
obvious in the context of Internet behavior."242
Finally, blogging, posting status updates, and tweeting present their
own compulsive appeal. "Once one has a taste of externalizing one's
thoughts and imagining that others care to ponder them," wrote one
commentator, "thinking that is not externalized seems kind of
pointless."2 43 On jury duty, boredom and access to Wi-Fi can combine to
make blogging or tweeting almost irresistible.2" "I am sitting in a big,
drab room with about ioo other people, waiting around to see if our
number is called to go up stairs and serve on a trial," posted one
prospective juror: "it is obvious that this must be blogged about."2 45
Given these forces, it seems unlikely that jury instructions -even coupled
with the threat of sanctions-will be enough to make jurors resist the
lure of the Internet.
III. THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE JURY
The foregoing responses to jurors' "bad behavior" are part of a
larger trend. The twentieth-century view of juries celebrated their
passivity as an aid to impartiality. Most of the rules governing juries were
designed to prevent any behavior that might interfere with jurors
keeping an open mind, and are still operational today. Rules of
Implications, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE INTERNET, supra note 236, at 55, 58; see also Adam N. Joinson,
Disinhibition and the Internet, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE INTERNET, supra note 236, at 75, 89
("Disinhibition is one of the few widely reported and noted media effects of online interaction.").
240. See John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 321, 321-26
(2oo4). Suler notes several reasons why people are less inhibited and reveal more about themselves
online, including dissociative anonymity ("you don't know me"), invisibility ("you can't see me"),
dissociative imagination ("it's just a game"), and minimizing authority ("we're equals"). Id. at 321-23.
241. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
242. Patricia R. Recupero, The Mental Status Examination in the Age of the Internet, 38 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 15, 19 (20Io). The author notes that qualities of computer-mediated
communications that facilitate impulsive behaviors include "anonymity, a reduced sense of
responsibility, altered time outlook, sensory input overload,... and altered consciousness." Id.
243. David Gibson, The Social Psychology of Facebook, Etc., COMPLEXITY & Soc. NETWORKS BLOG,
HARV. U. (Mar. 23, 2009, 12:13 PM), http://www.iq.harvard.edu/blog/netgov/2o0 9 /3/thesocial
psychology-ofLfaceb.html. "Consistent with [the above observation]," he noted, "one acquires the
cognitive habit of thinking and experiencing on behalf of an audience, and perhaps of formulating a
blog entry as the experience unfolds." Id.
244. See, e.g., Matt McCormick, Live Blogging Jury Duty, URB. HONKING (July 20, 2006),
http://urbanhonking.com/actionitems/2oo6/o 7 /20/live-blogging-jury-duty/ ("I am stuck in jury duty




procedure or individual instructions of judges forbid juries to discuss the
case among themselves until the end of the trial.46 Many jurors are
forbidden or discouraged from taking notes.247 The overwhelming
majority are not allowed to ask any questions of the witnesses, judge, or
lawyers.24 They usually receive instructions as to how to evaluate the
evidence and on the elements of the crimes at the very end of trial.249
However, it was not always this way. The earliest juries, when they
emerged in the thirteenth century, 2 o were to some extent "self-
informing, although the precise extent is open to question. While
prominent legal historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
maintained that medieval juries were expected to interview witnesses
and conduct their own factual investigations in advance of their
appearance in court,' modern scholars have found that early trial
246. See Jessica L. Bregant, Note, Let's Give Them Something to Talk About: An Empirical
Evaluation of Predeliberation Discussions, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1213, 1215 ("The overwhelming
majority of state and federal courts specifically prohibit 'predeliberation discussions' among jurors,
even in long and complex cases.").
247. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 5 (1994) ("[Judges often treat jurors] as children,
refusing to let them take notes during trial or to have written copies of the legal instructions they are
supposed to follow."). As Akhil Amar has observed, "This is idiocy." Amar, supra note I30, at 1185.
248. See Alschuler, supra note 17, at 161-62 ("We usually do not permit jurors to ask questions,
and we do not permit them to explain their rulings. Like good children, good jurors are to be seen and
not heard.").
249. See Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681, 684 (20oo)
("Although some judges do provide a brief introduction to the applicable law at the beginning of the
trial, most of the detailed instructions on the law are given after closing arguments.... One author
compared jurors in this system to a 'scorekeeper of an athletic contest' who does not know 'what acts
receive points or penalties until after the conclusion of the game."' (quoting Franklin Strier, Making
Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95, 6o-6i (1996))).
250. See Roger D. Groot, The Early Thirteenth Century Criminal Jury, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND
TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, i200-18oo, at 3, 17-18 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A.
Green eds., 1988) [hereinafter TWELVE GOOD MEN] (observing that the first true criminal trial by jury,
in which the jury had the power to acquit or condemn, took place at Westminster in 1220). It is not my
aim to go over the origins of the common law jury at length, as this ground has been covered in depth
by numerous eminent legal historians. See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 95, at 3-27; JAMES BRADLEY
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 47-84 (1898); Fisher, supra note
125, at 585-95; Langbein, supra note 6, at 1170-71.
251. See Daniel Klerman, Was the Jury Ever Self-Informing?, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 133-45 (2003)
(arguing, based on thirteenth-century treatises and contemporaneous court reports, that the jury was
self-informing and rarely needed to rely on in-court testimony); Langbein, supra note 6, at 1170 ("The
early jury was self-informing. No instructional trial was held to inform its verdict. If the jurors thought
they needed more information, they obtained it 'by consulting informed persons not called into
court."' (quoting 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW II ( 3 d ed. 1940))).
252. Pollock and Maitland wrote that it was "the duty of the jurors, so soon as they have been
summoned, to make inquiries about the facts of which they will have to speak when they come before
the court. They must collect testimony; they must weigh it and state the net result in a verdict."
2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME
OF EDWARD I, at 622 (1895); see 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 374
(3d. ed. 1894), reprinted in COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (William Draper Lewis ed., 1902)
("As to such evidence as the jury may have in their own consciences by their private knowledge of the
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records support a more nuanced view of a jury that, while likely familiar
with the parties and the facts of the incident, also received a portion of its
information in court.' Nonetheless, there is little doubt that early juries
were not entirely ignorant of the cause to be judged.254
A. THE JURY AT THE TIME OF THE FRAMERS
At the time of the Founding, there remained an expectation that the
jury would have some personal knowledge of the facts at issue.' Many
of the legal thinkers who had the most influence on the Framers took it
as a given that jurors would be familiar with the character of the accused
and the witnesses.256 Sir Edward Coke explained that trial "shall be [had
in the] towne, parish, or hamlet . . .within which the matter of fact
issuable is alledged, which is most certaine and neerest thereunto, the
inhabitants whereof may have the better and more certaine knowledge of
the fact.""
In the ratification debates, many of the supporters of a vicinage
requirement in the Sixth Amendment framed the question in terms of
the personal knowledge a local jury would bring to a trial."" Abraham
facts, it was an ancient doctrine that this had as much right to sway their judgment as the written or
parol evidence which is delivered in court."); see also THAYER, supra note 250, at 9o (observing that
medieval jurors "were men chosen as being likely to be already informed").
253. See Klerman, supra note 251, at 147-49 (concluding, based on a variety of trial accounts from
the thirteenth century, that "medieval jurors came to court with extensive knowledge about the case
and the defendant. They heard testimony, but they heard much less, and what they heard was less
important.").
254. While George Fisher has observed that the scant trial records from medieval times make it
difficult to confirm the theory of the fully "self-informing" jury, particularly in criminal cases, see
Fisher, supra note 125, at 591-93, he concludes that
it would be rash to suggest that early trial jurors came to court entirely ignorant of the facts
in the manner of modern jurors. The mechanics of pretrial and trial procedure made it likely
that at least some jurors had at least some knowledge of the event or the defendant before
trial.
Id. at 593-94. This, at least, accords with the traditional historical view that "[w]e must not think of
[the jurors] as coming into court ignorant, like their modern successors, of the cases about which they
will have to speak." 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 252, at 619.
255. See Engel, supra note to. at 1673. Engel argues that the common law
presumed that a jury would be drawn from the community that suffered the crime, and the
Framers of the Bill of Rights drafted the Sixth Amendment against this historical
presumption. The Framers knew about the dangers of local prejudice, yet they recognized
that only local juries could fulfill the adjudicative and representational purposes that
underlie the jury system.
Id.
256. See id. at 1679 (noting that the legal commentators "with whom the American Founders were
most familiar" were Coke, Hale, and Blackstone).
257. 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INsTITuTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 193, at
125a (1812).
258. See 2 DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION Io9-II (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891) (1787) [hereinafter
ELLIOT's DEBATES] (remarks of Abraham Holmes of Massachusetts); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 547 (remarks
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Holmes, arguing for a requirement that trials should be held "in the
vicinity where the fact was committed," relied on the fact that there "a
jury of the peers would, from their local situation, have an opportunity to
form a judgment of the character of the person charged with the crime,
and also to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.""' In contrast,
holding a trial elsewhere would force a person to be tried by "a jury of
strangers; a jury who may be interested in his conviction."
For the Anti-Federalists, it was not enough that the Constitution
prevented the worst excesses of the British in carrying off colonists to be
tried overseas; it was the local character of the jury that helped protect
liberty and ensure justice.26' Patrick Henry lambasted the framers of
Article III for specifying only that the trial of all crimes should be held in
the state where the crime had been committed.262 With such a loose
guarantee, he argued, trials could
proceed in a manner extremely dangerous to liberty: a person accused
may be carried from one extremity of the state to another, and be tried,
not by an impartial jury of the vicinage, acquainted with his character
and the circumstances of the fact, but by a jury unacquainted with
both, and who may be biased against him.2
This argument was open to rebuttal: Christopher Gore of
Massachusetts, in reply to Holmes, noted that
the idea that the jury coming from the neighborhood, and knowing the
character and circumstances of the party in trial, is promotive of
justice, on reflection, will appear not founded in truth. If the jury judge
from any other circumstances, but what are part of the cause in
question, they are not impartial.i
Indeed, Gore added, if the jury could be "perfectly ignorant of the
person in trial, a just decision would be more probable.265 Samuel
Johnston, Governor of North Carolina, echoed this reasoning, saying,
"We may expect less partiality when the trial is by strangers; and were I
to be tried for my property or life, I would rather be tried by
disinterested men, who were not biased, than by men who were perhaps
intimate friends of my opponent."'66
of Edmund Pendleton of Virginia) ("[The jury] should have some personal knowledge of the fact, and
acquaintance with the witnesses, who will come from the neighborhood.").
259. 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 258, at log-io (remarks of Abraham Holmes).
260. Id.
261. See Paul Finkelman, The Ten Amendments as a Declaration of Rights, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 351,
388-89 (1992) (describing how the Anti-Federalists wanted local juries to protect them from potential
oppression by the federal government).
262. 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 258, at 447 (statement of Patrick Henry of Virginia). Article
III states only that "the Trial of all Crimes .. .shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
263. 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 258, at 447.
264. 2 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 258, at 112 (remarks of Christopher Gore of Massachusetts).
265. Id. at 112-13.
266. 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 258, at 150 (remarks of governor Johnston).
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In the end, Gore's view gained ascendency, but the arguments of
Patrick Henry that "an impartial jury of the vicinage" would be
specifically "one acquainted with [the defendant's] character and the
circumstances of the fact" still resonated.267 As late as 1834, at least one
state court held that a jury may act "in some degree, from their own
knowledge of the character of the parties and their witnesses. It is for this
reason that the jurors are drawn from the vicinage."'26
B. THE MEANING OF IMPARTIALITY
The right to trial by jury is the only riht guaranteed both in the
Constitution itself and in the Bill of Rights.! Of the two constitutional
provisions however, only the Sixth Amendment provides that the jury
shall be "impartial"; the word does not appear in Article III.2"o It is
notable that the debates surrounding the adoption of the Constitution
and the ratification of the Sixth Amendment focused on the vicinage
requirement, and not on the definition of impartiality. One can only
surmise that the Framers were either not concerned with the definition of
impartiality, as it appeared to them self-evident, or were unable to come
to an agreement on what it meant. In any event, there is little reference
to its meaning in the writings of the Framers.27 '
At common law, jurors were "impartial," not because they knew
nothing about the case, but simply because they had no family ties to any
267. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 258, at 447 (statement of Patrick Henry of Virginia). This he
contrasted with "a jury unacquainted with both, and who may be biased against him." Id. To some
extent, this supports the argument that one of the aims of the Sixth Amendment was to protect
innocence. See AMAR, supra note III, at 9o ("The deep principles underlying the Sixth
Amendment[] ... are the protection of innocence and the pursuit of truth.").
268. M'Kain v. Love, 13 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 188, 189 (1834).
269. The right to trial by jury appears, respectively, in Article III of the Constitution and in the
Sixth Amendment. Article III provides:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may
by Law have directed.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth Amendment states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONsT. amend VI.
270. "Impartial" also does not appear in the Seventh Amendment, which guarantees a right to trial
by jury in civil cases. U.S. CONsT. amend VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."); see also Mark Cammack, In
Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 428 (995) ("Indeed, impartiality is the only
defining feature of the jury that is mentioned anywhere in the Constitution.").
271. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 46 (977) ("Little attention was given to the specific meaning of the words
'impartial jury' during the ratification debates, so we cannot say for certain what they meant then.");
Cammack, supra note 270, at 429 ("Despite the attention given to the right to a jury at the time the
Constitution was drafted, there is little direct evidence of the original understanding of the
requirement that the jury must be impartial.").
1618 [Vol. 62:I1579
JURY2.0
of the parties and no financial interest in the outcome."' What was
required was that they be "free and lawful, impartial and disinterested,
neither the enemies nor the too close friends of either litigant.""' This
remained the understanding into the eighteenth century: Sir Edward
Coke's oft-quoted pronouncement that a juror ought "to be indifferent
as he stands unsworne"274 meant indifferent in the sense of not having a
personal interest in the case, rather than lacking knowledge.
While jurors could be removed for cause even as far back as the
thirteenth century, just cause required either personal interest or
hostility, "as where there are deadly enmities between some of [the
jurors] and the indicted man, or there is a greedy desire to get his
land.""' Echoes of this understanding of partiality were to be found in
the debates surrounding ratification of the Constitution in the New
World: Patrick Henry explicitly equated impartiality and acquaintance."'
While not dispositive, these sources cast some light on how the Framers
viewed the impartiality requirement.
Today, the popular conception is that jurors must know nothing
about the case to be tried-witness two trial attorneys who recently
remarked, in response to the flurry of jurors looking for information
online, that "[t]he information age makes finding those 12 ignorant
persons-and keeping them ignorant-a daunting and maybe impossible
task."277
But the Supreme Court has never held that an impartial jury must
be ignorant. When Aaron Burr was tried for treason in 1807, the trial was
the subject of many inflammatory articles in the 7ress and the
impartiality of the jurors selected was hotly disputed. Rejecting the
idea that a jury had to be completely ignorant, Chief Justice Marshall,
272. See Engel, supra note to, at 1674.
273. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 252, at 619.
274. I COKE, supra note 257, § 234, at 15 5 b.
275. Klerman, supra note 251, at 133 (quoting a treatise attributed to Bracton, probably written in
the late 1220S or early 1230s); see also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 252, at 363 (noting that early jurors
could be challenged as being "kin to either party within the ninth degree" or having a financial interest
in the cause).
276. 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 258, at 447 (statement of Patrick Henry).
277. Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Confronting the Fact That Jurors Do Research: Trial
Attorneys Should Assume That, Despite Judges' Instructions, Jurors Will Engage in Illicit "E-
Discovery," 32 NAT'L L.J., Nov. 30, 2009, at 23. The authors cautioned readers that "[jiurors have the
tools-and they are using them-to discover all sorts of things about us, about our cases, about our
witnesses." The article advised litigators to "clean up" their own Internet presence, and to "[r]ethink
everything. You are being watched." Id.
278. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49,49 (D. Va. 18o7) (No. 14,692g). Burr's counsel argued
that the public's mind had been so filled with prejudice against Burr that finding an impartial jury
would be impossible. Id. The negative articles in the press and the repeated declarations of Burr's guilt
by the prosecutor created "such a ferment in the public mind that the prisoner could not have a fair
trial." Id.; see also ABRAMSON, supra note 247, at 38-39 (discussing the notoriety of the Burr trial).
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sitting by designation, wrote instead that the ablest jurors might well be
the best informed:
[T]o say that any man who had formed an opinion on any fact
conducive to the final decision of the case would therefore be
considered as disqualified from serving on the jury, would exclude
intelligent and observing men, whose minds were really in a situation
to decide upon the whole case according to the testimony.279
Marshall noted that jurors with no knowledge of the case were not
required, but he contrasted the "light impressions which may fairly be
supposed to yield to the testimony that may be offered" with "those
strong and deep impressions which will close the mind against the
testimony that may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat
that testimony, and resist its force."'8 While prescient in many ways,
Marshall was far from the first to make these observations, since borne
out by social psychologists."" "The human understanding when it has
once adopted an opinion," observed the English philosopher Francis
Bacon, "draws all things else to support and agree with it. And though
there be a greater number and weight of instances to be found on the
other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some
distinction sets aside and rejects.""'
In evaluating whether a particular juror can be impartial, the
question is not whether a juror is "as white paper"'8' but rather whether
she can lay aside her initial impressions to judge the case with an open
mind. "The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant
have a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors," wrote the Court in 1975.
"Qualified jurors need not, however, be totally ignorant of the facts and
issues involved. "284
The Court reiterated this standard last year in the trial of Jeffrey
Skilling, the former CEO of Enron. "Juror impartiality," wrote Justice
Ginsburg, "does not require ignorance."'"" Rejecting Skilling's claim that
he could not receive a fair trial in Houston because of the amount of
press coverage and commentary the Enron scandal had generated, the
279. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 51.
280. Id.
281. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,
2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 177 (1998) (noting the extensive empirical evidence that once someone has
taken a position, "one's primary purpose becomes that of defending or justifying that position").
282. I FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM aphorism 46 (1620).
283. Mylock v. Saladine, (1764) 96 Eng. Rep. 278 (K.B.). In that case, Lord Mansfield observed:
"A juror should be as white paper, and know neither plaintiff nor defendant, but judge of the issue
merely as an abstract proposition upon the evidence produced before him." Id.
284. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-8oo (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,722 (1961)).
285. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2902 (2010).
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Court emphasized that jurors "need not enter the box with empty heads
in order to determine the facts impartially."
C. JURIES JUDGING THE LAW
In colonial times, it was widely accepted that the jury would be judge
of the law as well as of the facts. In prerevolutionary Massachusetts, for
example, juries "could ignore judges' instructions on the law and decide
the law by themselves in both civil and criminal cases.""2
In 1735, the jury's power to determine the law was famously
celebrated by Andrew Hamilton, who defended New York publisher
John Peter Zenger by appealing explicitly to the jury's power, which he
called "beyond all dispute to determine both the law and the fact."'M
John Adams, shortly before the adoption of the Constitution, wrote that
it would be "an Absurdity to suppose that the Law would oblige [jurors]
to find a Verdict according to the Direction of the Court, against their
own Opinion, Judgment, and Conscience." 89
The Supreme Court, sitting as a trial court in 1794, echoed this view,
if more soberly, in the instructions Chief Justice Jay delivered to the jury.
While he acknowledged the presumption that juries were "the best
judges of facts" and that judges were "the best judges of law," he told the
jurors, "you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of
both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy.""
But this position had eroded sufficiently that by the time Justice
Story stated his view of the division of labor between judge and jury,91
one hundred years after Hamilton's famous pronouncements in the
Zenger trial, Story's stance was becoming preeminent. Although the
constitutions of three states still provide that jurors shall determine both
law and fact,292 over time the state courts "essentially nullified the[sel
constitutional provisions. 9'
286. Id. at 2925.
287. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE
IN MASSACHUSETrS SOCIETY, 176o-1830, at 3 (1975).
288. John Peter Zenger was charged with seditious libel for publishing criticisms of the Governor
of New York. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 5, at 871-73. Hamilton conceded the publication of
the comments, but claimed that truth was a defense and that the matter was for the jury: "I know they
have the right beyond all dispute to determine both the law and the fact, and where they do not doubt
of the law, they ought to do so," Hamilton told the court, "[L]eaving it to the judgment of the Court
whether the words are libelous or not in effect renders juries useless." Id. at 873 (quoting JAMES
ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW
YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 78 (1963)). The jury acquitted Zenger, and the account of the trial, in
pamphlet form, was widely circulated in the colonies. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 5, at 871-73.
289. I LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
290. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794).
291. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545).
292. See GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. XI ("In criminal cases... the jury shall be the judges of the
law and the facts."); IND. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the facts."); MD. CONST., DECL. OF RTs art. 23 ("In the trial of all
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D. CAN WE DRAW ANY LESSONS FROM THE PAST?
There seems to be solid historical precedent for a better informed,
more active jury.2" Under the common law and colonial jury model, the
jury was more on a par with the judge and was an active participant in
the process." The jury also had flexibility to exercise mercy and
determine penalties in a way that could subordinate the law to its
members' sense of justice." Arguably, such a jury more accurately
reflects the conscience of the community than one which does not have
access to all the facts and has no say over the law. How a more active jury
could be achieved without violating the defendant's protections under
the Sixth Amendment is the subject of the next Part.
IV. FACING THE FUTURE
Assuming that jurors' growing propensity to research their cases and
communicate in new ways is not just a passing fad-and there is little
indication that it is-the deeper effects on the justice system have yet to
be fully understood. One obstacle to that understanding is that we are
unlikely ever to know the full extent of the problem. Most online
transgressions happen by stealth, so there may never be a full account of
how widespread they are. Empirical research, through juror surveys and
interviews, might give us a better picture, but it would still rely on juror
self-reporting and be subject to jurors minimizing their misdeeds.2"
In addition, any reconsideration of the jury's abilities and function
has to be evaluated against the background of the "largely vestigial" role
the jury trial actually plays in the system as a whole.s While the jury trial
may retain symbolic importance, serving as a reminder of our aspirations
to fairness and equity,2" one thing it does not do is adjudicate the vast
majority of cases." The Sixth Amendment's promise that "[iln all
criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact.").
293. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 5, at 911 & n.237 (citations omitted).
294. See supra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
296. See John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at
Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. Io47, lo62-63 (1994) (describing practice by eighteenth century
jurors of manipulating their verdicts to mitigate the death penalty).
297. A British researcher suspected that such minimization occurred in her survey of 668 jurors.
Thomas, supra note 31, at 43.
298. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117,
2124 (1998).
299. See id. at 2144.
300. The current rate of jury trials is a little more than three percent in federal court for all
dispositions, whether conviction or acquittal. See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, ST. U. N.Y.
AT ALBANY (2009), http://www.albany.edulsourcebook/pdf/t5242oo 9 .pdf (showing that out of 86,798
case dispositions in district court, there were 2660 jury trials and 431 bench trials). Available state
court statistics do not track rates of acquittal at trial, but reflect a jury trial rate of four percent when
only convictions are counted. See Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2oo6, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
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criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury"3 ' is already honored more in the breach
than in the observance. For the overwhelming majority of criminal
defendants, we have an adversarial system in name alone, with jury trials
as rare as a hippopotamus in New York City.3 o2
And so the jury trial is arguably in decline, both in function and in
reputation.3 03 At the Founding, the importance of protecting the right to
trial by jury was one issue that brought both Federalists and Anti-
Federalists together. Alexander Hamilton famously wrote that both
sides, if they agreed upon nothing else, "concur at least in the value they
set upon the trial by jury. Or if there is any difference between them it
consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty, the
latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.',
304
Today, the jury system has been subject to bitter criticism for the
better part of two centuries. Commentators charge the adversarial
system with privileging combat at the expense of truth seeking.3 o' The
system of jury selection and peremptory challenges is believed to result
in juries that are not representative of the abilities and educational level
of the community.'" Our dissatisfaction with the jury reflects a deep-
seated ambivalence, "sometimes romanticizing jurors as zealous yeomen
alert to abuses of governmental power and sometimes treating them as
helpless, weak-minded, irrational, vindictive, and easily swayed
Tbl. 4-1 (2006); see also Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts, 1976-2002,
I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIEs 755, 764 (2004) ("[By 2002] felony trials comprised only 3 percent of all
felony dispositions, and the felony jury trial rate had fallen to 22 per looo dispositions fjust over 2
percent of all felony dispositions).").
301. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
302. John H. Langbein, On the Myth of the Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of Criminal
Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 119, 121 (1992) ("Can you find a hippopotamus in the Bronx?
Yes, there's one in the Bronx Zoo, but it has nothing to do with life in the Bronx. It's a goner. And so,
too, stunningly, is criminal jury trial, which has ceased to typify American criminal justice.").
303. See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, State Court Reform of the American Jury, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 166 (2oo8), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/scholarship/state-court-
reform-of-the-american-jury/ ("[By the 199os] many citizens viewed the jury as archaic, emotional,
irrational, and unintelligent.").
304. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 456 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
305. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL I (2005) (critiquing the
"truth-impairing incentives of the adversary system").
306. See Douglas W. Ell, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and
the Seventh Amendment, so CONN. L. REV. 775, 782 (1978) ("[Voir dire and peremptory challenges]
can strongly contribute to the selection of a jury which is not representative of the highly skilled and
educated members of the community"). This view, while widespread, so far has not been supported
empirically. See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin & John W. Emerson, Is There a Bias Against Education in the
Jury Selection Process?, 38 CONN. L. REV. 325, 328 (2006). Levin and Emerson conducted an empirical
study of jury venires in the District of Connecticut over the course of a year. They found "no evidence
that juries are undereducated relative to the venires from which they are selected. Indeed, juries seem




children."3" We praise their salt-of-the-earth "common sense" but
excoriate them for being "illiterate plebeians, easily misled."'1
Some scholars trace our ambivalence to the increasing diversity of
the jury, as the conscience of the community was far more predictable
when expressed by twelve propertied white men of the colonies.3" On
some level, we must reevaluate what it means for the jury to represent
the conscience of the community when the community itself speaks with
so many different voices. Juror misuse of the Internet presents a
challenge to the old norms, but also may provide an opportunity for us to
reconsider what we want from our juries.
A. THE COSTS OF INACTION
One clear cost of inaction is the risk of unfairness to individual
defendants, who may be defending not only against criminal charges
brought by the prosecutor, but also against the unseen enemy of Internet
gossip and innuendo. An overarching concern with jurors relying so
heavily on information they can unearth online is that there is no quality
control on the Internet. Unlike a newspaper, which employs paid fact
checkers, the Internet is based on the paradigm that anyone can say
whatever they want, and the truth will rise to the top of the Google
search results page.3"o Much of the information on the Web may be
erroneous, misattributed, or malicious. When a defendant's liberty or life
is at stake, the potential for prejudice is considerable.
Not addressing the problem now will lead to the rampant inequity of
some jurors seeking out extrajudicial information; some jurors abiding by
the rules; and, in the absence of admissions or informants, the defendant
not knowing what, exactly, the jury knows. This impairment of the jury
function could, in turn, contribute to a greater decline in the jury's
reputation.3 '
307. Alschuler, supra note 17, at 232.
308. See P.J.R. King, "Illiterate Plebeians, Easily Misled": Jury Composition, Experience, and
Behavior in Essex, 1735-1815, in TWELVE GOOD MEN, supra note 250, at 256-58 (quoting eighteenth-
century commentators describing jurors as "low and ignorant country people," "the meaner sort," and
"ignorant and illiterate persons").
309. Cf Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 5, at 916 ("Over the course of the nineteenth century, as
American society grew more diverse and jury membership more inclusive ... the belief that jurors'
consciences would yield sound, shared, consistent answers to legal questions undoubtedly faded.").
310. See Virginia Heffernan, What "Fact-Checking" Means Online, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2oo, at
14 (Magazine) (noting that people have become so reliant on Google search results that the "Internet
wasn't the accurate or the inaccurate thing; it was the only thing"); see also Bing Pan et al., In Google
We Trust: Users' Decisions on Rank, Position, and Relevance, 12 J. COMPUTER MEDIATED COMM. 8o,
817 (2oo7) (reporting clinical results of eye movement tests that suggest "an increased probability of
misinformation, particularly in circumstances of topic naivete" linked to the ranking of Google search
results).
31I. See, e.g., B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights": Creating Educated
and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. I229, 1229 (1993) ("[C]oncerns and complaints about jury trials,
and how such trials impact and empower jurors in deciding cases, continue to abound.") (emphasis
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If a tipping point is reached where defendants believe it is
sufficiently likely that their jurors will be digging around into parties'
backgrounds, scouring the Web for evidence of their criminal past,
sending friend requests to attractive witnesses, and blogging about the
experience, defendants might decide to forsake trials altogether. Those
with vast resources and Internet savvy could wage propaganda wars on
the Internet, strategically planting favorable information where jurors
might be likely to stumble across it,"' but the indigent defendants who
are in the vast majority might simply abstain. From an already negligible
fraction of cases, trials could then dwindle down to a handful of "trials of
the century" or simply disappear."'
In the circumstances, it is not entirely surprising that one
experienced district court judge wondered, if juror misuse of the Internet
could not be prevented, "can the jury system survive or will we become a
civil law country that abandons jury trials altogether?"3 14 If nothing is
done, the outlook is bleak.
B. JURY 2.0
In the face of this unauthorized jury activity, it is not enough to
reflexively insist on the old norms of the passive, uninformed jury. The
old norms may be unenforceable as a practical matter. Rather than
fruitlessly attempting to make the new jurors conform to the old model,
taking action only in those rare cases where we find out about violations,
it might make better sense to work towards some kind of accommodation
between the defendant's right to a fair trial and the contemporary jury's
thirst for information.
A set of responses must be developed to address the various
manifestations of jurors' Internet use. One good place to start is with the
efforts, particularly in state courts over the past twenty years, to reform
the jury system so that jurors can be more engaged in the proceedings.315
omitted); Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts ofJury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 377, 382 (1996) ("[I1n recent years, dissatisfaction with the functioning of the jury in both civil
and criminal trials has been of increasing public and scholarly concern.").
312. See, e.g., Hibbitts, supra note 81 (describing Martha Stewart's defense website).
313. It should be acknowledged, however, that scholars have been lamenting the death of the jury
trial and writing articles with titles like "The Vanishing Jury" since at least 1928. See Raymond Moley,
The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 107-09 (1928) (charting incidence of guilty pleas in New
York from 1839 to 1926, and concluding that the rate of guilty pleas increased from twenty-five
percent to ninety percent over that period). The fact that the institution staggers on is a testament to at
least some resilience.
314. Shira A. Scheindlin, The Future of Litigation, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 5, 20oo), http://www.law.com/jsp/
nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=120244201 oo&fontcolorredFreefontThe Future ofLLitigation&slretur
n=s&hbxlogin=t#.
315. See, e.g., Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Some Suggestions for the Critical Appraisal of a
More-Active Jury, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 231 (1990) (reporting an ambiguous response in a survey of
judges' attitudes regarding juror note taking and submitting questions for witnesses).
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While not developed in direct response to issues of juror misconduct on
the Internet, these "active jury" proposals are promising: they encourage
jurors to take a more active role by allowing them to ask questions of the
witnesses, take notes, and request clarification.' The judges and
jurisdictions that have employed these methods report much higher juror
satisfaction." Presumably, these techniques would go some way towards
defusing the frustration and enforced passivity that may goad jurors to
seek help online.
i. Confronting Extraneous Facts
The most pressing issue is how we should cope with the flow of
unauthorized information reaching the jury room. It is tempting to
suggest that we should simply open the floodgates and embrace it. One
can make a plausible argument that the rules of evidence have become
obsolete and should be abandoned and that jurors should simply be
trusted to evaluate all available information.3'1 Allowing character
evidence, hearsay, and other relevant but traditionally inadmissible
information to come before the jury would demonstrate confidence in
the jury's abilities to assess correctly the information and alleviate the
suspicion of some jurors that the lawyers are deliberately concealing the
truth.319 It would be consonant with the jury's historical role. In an ideal
world, this could promote the accuracy of verdicts and make trials less of
a gladiatorial contest of lawyerly skill and more of a quest for truth.
But this is not an ideal world, and while the idea of returning to a
full-information model along the lines that Jeremy Bentham once
316. See Keene & Handrich, supra note 199, at 21 ("To the extent that [jurors] have reasonable
and proper questions for witnesses, they are less likely to conduct research on their own if the
witnesses addresses [sic] them more completely."). The American Bar Association endorsed these
reforms, with the exception of juror questioning in criminal cases, in 2005. See Patricia Lee Refo,
Principles for Juries and Jury Trials, 2005 AM. BAR Ass'N AMERICAN JURY PROJECT I7-20 [hereinafter
ABA PRINCIPLES].
317. See, e.g., Mark A. Frankel, A Trial Judge's Perspective on Providing Tools for Rational Jury
Decisionmaking, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 221, 225 (1990) ("There is no question in my mind that providing
jurors with additional tools such as preliminary instruction, notetaking, and jury questioning enhances
the rational aspects of the jury's fact-finding role."); Judith S. Kaye, My Life as Chief Judge: The
Chapter on Juries, 78 N.Y. ST. B. J. 1o, 13 (2oo6) (reporting findings of survey of jurors in New York
state after experimenting with jurors taking notes, submitting written questions, and providing them
with a copy of the judge's final instructions as "overwhelmingly positive"); Shepard, supra note 303, at
169 (noting with approval reformers abolishing "roadblocks to sensible decision making"); Jeanine
Turgeon & Elizabeth A. Francis, Improving Pennsylvania's Justice System Through Jury System
Innovations, 18 WIDENER L.J. 419, 436-48 (20o9) (discussing Pennsylvania's adoption of rules allowing
for juror note taking, written instructions, substantive preliminary instructions, and juror questioning
to be promising improvement in the state's jury system).
318. Alschuler has made powerful arguments for "abandoning our cumbersome, patronizing rules
of evidence and trusting jurors with the facts," and "viewing jurors neither as child savants nor as child
simpletons but as responsible adults." Alschuler, supra note 17, at 232.
319. See Green, supra note 19, at 700-os ("[Jiurors are sometimes led to conclude that trial
lawyers are being deceitful when in fact the lawyers are simply abiding by the rules of evidence.").
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suggested seems attractive on its face, it is ultimately unworkable.320 Even
setting aside the longstanding debates about jurors' abilities to process
(truthful) unfavorable information about a defendant without
compromising their impartiality, there is no way to process all of the
information on the Internet about every defendant in a fair manner.
Much of the information on the Internet is presented as fact, but is often
driven by personal or political agendas that are more or less transparent.32 '
If jurors are equally likely to find not only true information about a
defendant's criminal record, but also false allegations that the defendant
abused his children, for example, every criminal case could devolve into
a series of mini-trials in which defendants would have to defend not only
against the instant criminal charges, but against every allegation against
them on the Web, no matter how biased or fabricated. If ever there were
a time when juries could be entrusted with all extant information, that
moment has now passed.
Solutions must therefore be found that maintain the exclusionary
nature of trials, while acknowledging the Pandora's Box of information
online.' Courts need to work on ways of explaining to jurors why they
should not surf, blog, or tweet during trial. If these instructions come
across as no more than another admonition, jurors may well shrug them
off. But if the instructions enlist the jurors' help as equal participants in a
common enterprise with the court and the litigants, the goal of which is
to ensure the defendant a fair trial, they might reduce the kinds of online
misconduct that arise out of boredom and disaffection.
A good example of an instruction that explains the prohibition in
terms of fairness to the parties and the integrity of the trial is the one
given by a state court judge, who, after telling the jurors that they may
not discuss the case, says:
Here's why: We go to some great lengths to make sure that all of the
information or input you get about this case comes from people who
walk into this courtroom, swear to tell the truth, sit in this chair, and
say what they have to say in front of the prosecutor, in front of the
defendant, and in front of all of you. And we do that because that's the
fair way to do it. If you get information, even comments, input from
320. See 5 BENTHAM, supra note 20.
321. See, e.g., Michel Marriott, Rising Tide: Sites Born of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. i8, 1999, at Gi
("[Hate websites] are presented as ordinary home pages or educational sites."); David Mehegan, Bias,
Sabotage Haunt Wikipedia's Free World, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 2oo6, at At ("The revelations that
political bias has crept into articles raises new questions about an Internet phenomenon that some are
acclaiming as the future of information.").
322. As a threshold matter, lawyers should conduct their own defensive research as a matter of
course, so that they know what might be found online about their client if anyone were to look. This
could include a check of court records, popular criminal databases, Google, social networking sites,
and so forth. Lawyers would be well advised to ask their clients whether they maintain any blogs or
have posted comments on other websites. At a minimum, this would give attorneys an idea of the
universe in which they might be operating.
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somebody else where the defendant can't hear, or the prosecutor can't
hear what you're hearing, or your fellow jurors, that's not fair. That is
not a fair way to decide a criminal charge in this country. What's fair is
for you to decide this case only on what happens inside this courtroom.32 3
The judge then instructs the jurors not to conduct any investigations on
their own, whether on the street or on the Internet. Finally, he extracts a
promise from them that they will abide by the rules:
So I have two ways I can do this. I can lock you up-it's called
sequestering, it's a fancy word for locking you up-during the course of
the trial, or I can have you promise me that you will strictly abide by
my instructions during the trial, and not do any investigations, not have
any communications about the case .... Will each of you promise me
that you will follow those instructions?32 4
If such instructions were combined with rules that allowed jurors to
take a more active part in the proceedings, their effectiveness might
increase. For example, a number of jurisdictions have begun allowing
jurors to submit questions for the witnesses."' Typically, jurors will
submit written questions to the judge; after review and consent of both
parties, the question can then be put to the witness.2 Usually, the
question will be asked by the judge, so that no particular juror is
identified by either the parties or the witness.' This would provide an
323. Video: Hon. Donald E. Shelton, "No Googling, No Texting" Jury Instruction Video, NAT'L
CTR. FOR STATE Cs. (Sept. 13, 200, 11:42:45), http://www.ncsc.org/topics/jury/jury-selection-trial-and-
deliberations/resource-guide.aspx (scroll down to "Jury Instructions" subheading) (last visited July 4,
2011).
324. Id. at 11:45:15. Obviously, it helps that Judge Shelton has an avuncular, folksy manner that
establishes a rapport with the jurors. But, regardless of delivery, these instructions succinctly cover a
number of bases that should be addressed in any instruction dealing with Internet use: (I) they
acknowledge the fact that most jurors frequently use the Internet in their daily lives; (2) they make
clear that a trial is not ordinary life and that jurors have a particular responsibility to be fair to the
parties whose rights they are adjudicating; (3) they remind the jurors that a criminal defendant can
only confront evidence that is presented in open court; and (4) they extract a promise from the jurors
to refrain from misuse of the Internet during trial. See id.
325. This practice is cautiously endorsed by the American Bar Association, which approves of
juror questions in civil trials, but which in criminal trials leaves the decision whether to ask questions
in the trial judge's discretion, taking into consideration "the historic reasons why courts in a number of
jurisdictions have discouraged juror questions and the experience in those jurisdictions that have
allowed it." ABA PRINCIPLES, supra note 316, at 18; see also Akhil Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten
Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. I169, 1185 (995) ("[S]hould not juries at least be allowed
to forward questions to the judge to be asked, if not substantively inappropriate?"); Dann, supra note
3 1 , at 1253 ("[Q]uestioning by jurors is an important device for permitting more (and much needed)
juror participation in the fact-finding process.").
326. See, e.g., Neil P. Cohen, Better, Happier Juries, 39 TENN. B.J. 16, 23 (2003) (noting advantages
of permitting jurors to ask questions); Dann, supra note 311, at 1253 (same).
327. While this sounds potentially time consuming, judges who have used the technique report that
it does not take more than a few minutes. See Frankel, supra note 317, at 225 (noting that, in his
experience, this process takes "approximately three minutes per question"). In addition, in
jurisdictions that have experimented with the practice, it seems that jurors in fact rarely exercise their
option to ask questions; instead, the primary benefit appears to be that the jurors feel that they are an
active part of the process. See Turgeon & Francis, supra note 317, at 446-48 (2009).
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outlet for jurors' frustration by increasing their participation and
decreasing any confusion. It would also give the parties an indication of
what the jurors' concerns are, helping the parties focus their
presentations. A jury that received answers to its questions, or that at
least was given some reasonable explanation as to why certain questions
should not be answered, would be much less likely to search for
supplementary information on the Internet.
2. Allowing Jurors to Determine the Law
Another issue is whether instructions could be made sufficiently
understandable and plain that jurors would not have to resort to seeking
legal definitions online. Over the past twenty years, there have been
frequent calls, many of them by judges, for developing accurate and
understandable instructions that jurors can actually follow.329 Now that
jurors can look up legal terms,33o the incomprehensibility and
unwieldiness of jury instructions must be addressed promptly. Once
again, allowing jurors to request clarification if they do not understand a
definition would be an important step towards eliminating these
"dictionary" offenses.
On the more complex question of jurors seeking to understand the
potential sentencing consequences of their decisions, the legal and
normative arguments are strong that, at least in some cases, they should
be given that information by the judge. The body of authority holding
that jurors should not be told of any possible sentence rests primarily on
tradition, as well as on the unsupported assumption that merely speaking
of punishment implies that the defendant is guilty, or, conversely, that
informing jurors of the possibility of a harsh sentence is tantamount to
endorsing nullification."'
But a murky sense of "tradition," established a century after the
ratification of the Sixth Amendment, and unsubstantiated concerns
about how a jury would use this information, fail to establish that the jury
should always be uninformed. Historically, the jury had the power to
mitigate the harsh consequences of a primarily capital sentencing scheme
by routinely finding defendants guilty of lesser offenses." If an
328. See Cohen, supra note 326, at 23.
329. See, e.g., Turgeon & Francis, supra note 317, at 426-27.
330. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
331. 75A AM. JUR. 2d Trial § 1210 (2010) ("The reasons prohibiting an instruction on the sentence
that could be imposed are to minimize the possibility of jury sympathy based on the potential
sentence, and to ensure that the jury decides a case according to the law and evidence presented,
rather than speculating on the consequences of the verdict." (footnote omitted)); see also Jeffrey
Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A Prescription for Informing Juries of the Consequences of
Conviction, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 2223, 2225 (20I0) ("Indeed, a largely unexamined doctrine prohibiting
informing the jury of potential punishment has become firmly entrenched in American law.").
332. See Langbein, supra note 296, at lo62-63 (describing the practice of having a jury
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important function of the jury is to reflect the judgment of the
community, that judgment falls not only upon the accused and his
conduct, but upon the penalties for that conduct assessed in society's
name.
Nonetheless, giving this information would not always be without
cost to the defendant, particularly where a sentence would turn, as it so
often does, on the defendant's prior record. Informing the jury of the
sentencing consequences of a guilty verdict might make the most sense in
situations where there is a mandatory minimum sentence or where a
conviction would trigger a mandatory life sentence under a state's "three
strikes" law. In cases where punishment is fixed rather than
discretionary, a jury that was aware of the consequences of its decisions
would at least exercise its power knowingly.3
3. Is There a Place for Juror Self-Expression?
Juror blogging, tweeting, and status updating raise interesting
questions about the relationship between the opacity of jury verdicts and
their legitimacy. To the extent that such missives do diminish the gravitas
of the institution, then other means of letting jurors process their
experiences, such as allowing jurors to discuss the case with each other
during the course of the trial, so long as they refrain from making any
ultimate determinations,334 could diminish the urge to blog.
A bolder approach would be to try to locate a new source of
legitimacy for jury verdicts, one that grows not out of inscrutability but
understanding. One of the values lost in the dismissive popular attitude
towards jurors as ignorant and uneducated is an appreciation of the
difficulty of their task. Trying to recreate past events is fraught with
perils, and because of concerns about unfairness to defendants, we deny
jurors many of the tools that we ourselves use in daily life. The jurors
who take their role seriously-and we can assume that they are in the
majority-face a lonely and difficult task, which can cause them great
"downcharge" or "downvalue" charged crimes in order to mitigate the death penalty). Langbein found
that in nearly a quarter of the cases at the Old Bailey during the 1750s, juries returned a partial
verdict, finding the defendant guilty of a lesser offense. See id. at 1o63. "For a few offenses, like
picking pockets, the juries all but invariably downvalued, expressing a social consensus that the capital
sanction was virtually never appropriate." Id.
333. It is by no means a certainty that juries would mitigate their verdicts in response to sentencing
information. Nonetheless, in cases where the punishment, by any rational measure, seems
disproportionate to the crime, one wonders whether the jury would have changed its verdict if it
understood the consequences. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1978)
(upholding life sentence of a defendant convicted of forging a check for $88-30 under Kentucky
Habitual Offender Statute).
334. See Dann, supra note 311, at 1262 (advocating further research on the question of whether
jurors would benefit from structured discussions throughout the trial); Shepard, supra note 303, at 169




anxiety.' Describing their experiences might be a justifiable attempt to
relieve that pressure.
If we do not want jurors to discuss the case among themselves, for
fear of solidifying opinions before all the evidence is in, perhaps we
should consider allowing jurors to externalize their thoughts, maybe even
to post comments in some centralized, anonymous forum. So long as the
jurors did not specifically identify the case they were involved with, they
could describe their impressions and express their feelings in a controlled
environment. Whether such a measure is desirable would depend on
whether jurors end up straying so far from a "black box" model in the
future that the paradigm must be abandoned. If that were to happen, and
such a compendium of juror voices were made public, it could
conceivably lead to renewed appreciation of the importance and
difficulty of the jury's task."'
4. Curbing Investigations of Jurors
Finally, as the situation develops, there might be a need for some
kind of curb on the investigation of jurors by attorneys. It is not at all
clear that lawyers should be able to obtain more information about
jurors than is provided on the record in voir dire, particularly when this
information is used to peremptorily strike jurors.3" Short of relying on
anonymous juries,33' the only way to diminish the incentives for these
kinds of investigations would be to reduce or eliminate peremptory
challenges.339 There are strong democratic reasons for abandoning the
335. There is evidence, particularly in violent crime and capital cases, that some jurors can suffer
from a form of post-traumatic stress disorder. See, e.g., James E. Kelley, Addressing Juror Stress: A
Trial Judge's Perspective, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 97, 124 (1994) (noting that jurors in serious criminal cases
often suffer from severe stress, and recommending postverdict debriefing by the judge as an
appropriate response); Daniel W. Shuman et al., The Health Effects of Jury Service, 18 LAW &
PYSCHOL. REV. 267, 268 (1994) ("[Jlurors may experience stress from being removed from their
families and jobs, from being shown especially graphic evidence, or from the trial process itself.").
336. A full exploration of the costs and benefits of a more open model of jury deliberations is
beyond the scope of this Article.
337. The arguments for balancing the defendant's right to an impartial jury and the juror's right to
privacy will be the subject of a future article.
338. There is nonetheless a strong case to make in favor of anonymous juries, particularly given
the potential privacy invasions of attorneys' online sleuthing. See Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The
Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 125 (1996)
("[A]nonymity can enhance the participation of citizens in jury service, the reliability of the voir dire
process, the quality of jury deliberations, and the fairness of criminal verdicts.").
339. Even if the peremptory challenge were retained, one could fairly question whether the
number of peremptories allowed by statute needs to be so high. See, e.g. MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD.
PROC. § 8-30(c) (201) (allowing, for cases with the potential of twenty years or greater imprisonment,
ten peremptory challenges for defendant and five for state); MINN. R. CIuM. PROc. 26.o2 subd. 6
(allowing, for offenses with the potential for life imprisonment, fifteen peremptories for defendant and
nine for state; for all other offenses, five peremptories for defendant and three for state); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2B:23 -13 (b) (West Supp. 2011) (allowing, for serious felonies, twenty peremptory challenges
for defendant and twelve for the state).
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peremptory challenge so that juries could be selected in a way that
reflects "the breadth of our communities rather than the group left over
when lawyers had expended their peremptory challenges on pet hates."34 o
With a shorter voir dire and fewer strikes to make, the value of the
information to the lawyers would be reduced to its usefulness as a
persuasive tactic.
This Part raises more questions than it answers. But if we begin to
ask the right questions, then we have a chance of creating a more
functional, more active, possibly even a more transparent type of jury
that might actually survive into the twenty-first century.
CONCLUSION
New technologies that could never have been contemplated by the
Framers are challenging long-established rules that have shaped the
modem norm of the passive, uninformed jury. Now that jurors have the
ability to circumvent these rules on their own, the time seems ripe to
reevaluate both the functioning of the jury and the symbolic role it plays
in our justice system. The history of the jury supports a vision of a
stronger, more active jury that can participate more fully in the fact-
finding process and is aware of the consequences of its decisions. What
the future holds has yet to be written.
34o. Alschuler, supra note 17, at 232. A jury selection system without peremptory challenges might
also entail "respecting the jurors' privacy, abandoning our probing of their psyches, beliefs, and
practices in extended voir dire examinations." Id.
1632 [Vol. 62:1579
